Henry Kissinger 'ulus devlet'lere dikkat çekti
CNN Turk - 19 Kasım, 2007 21:57:00 (TSİ)
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin dış politikası üzerinde en etkili isimlerinden biri olan Henry Kissinger, jeopolitik atmosferin değişmekte olduğunu söyledi. Ulus devlet sisteminin çöktüğünü belirten Kissinger, bunun bir tehdit olduğunu ifade etti.
Wall Street Journal gazetesine konuşan Kissinger, uluslararası politikaya dair vizyonunu anlatırken, ABD ile Avrupa arasında felsefi farklılıklar oluşmaya başladığına dikkat çekerek, Ortadoğu ve Asya'da batı karşıtlığının daha geniş bir ortak payda olduğunu belirtti.
"ABD'nin bir sonraki başkanı kim olursa olsun, yeni yönetim, sırf başkanın adı değişti diyen, ilişkilerin düzeleceğine inanırsa büyük hayal kırıklığına uğrar" diyen
Kissinger, dünyada 300 yıldır bilinen ulus devlete dayalı sistemin çöktüğünü ifade etti.
Kissinger, "Avrupa'da ulus devlet zayıflıyor. Sadece Rusya, ABD ve Asya'da klasik formunu koruyor. Bu da uluslararası istikrar için Nazi Almanyası ve Sovyetler Birliği'nden daha büyük tehdit" dedi.
"ABD ve Avrupa terörle mücadele gibi önemli dış politika konularında birbirinden ayrılıyor. Bunun ardında her iki tarafın halkından isteyebileceği fedakarlık derecesi yatıyor" diyen Kissinger, Avrupa'nın halkından daha fazla fedakarlık bekleyemeyeceği için yumuşak güce yöneldiğini, bunun da ABD ve AB arasında olası bir mutabakatı zora soktuğunu söyledi.
Ortadoğu ve Asya'da milliyetçilik hala önemli bir güç olduğunu kaydeden Kissinger, batı karşıtı İslam'ın kendisini daha çok gösterdiğini belirtti.
BM'nin yeniden oluşturulması gereken bir kurum olduğunu ifade eden Kissinger, "Konsey, Hindistan, Japonya, Brezilya ve Almanya gibi ülkeleri bünyesinde barındırmadığından, uluslararası toplumun gerçekliklerini yeterince temsil etmiyor" dedi.
Washigton'da siyaset anlayışının değiştiğini kaydeden Kissinger, ABD kongresinde Amerikan çıkarlarını uzun süreli gözeten senatörlerin bulunmadığını belirtti.
Kissinger, senatörlerin bir sonraki seçimlere odaklanmak gibi kısa vadeli siyasi hesaplar peşinde olduğunu söyledi.
Invasion is wrong answer to Turkey’s problems
Financial Times - Invasion is wrong answer to Turkey’s problems
By Wesley Clark
November 15 2007 18:41 | Last updated: November 15 2007 18:41
Just over a week after US president George W. Bush and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, met in Washington, Turkish troops remained poised to move across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to destroy elements of the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK). We can only hope that a solution based on the idea of joint co-operation against the PKK that seemed to be forged in the Oval Office meeting, focusing on diplomatic engagement between the US, Turkey, Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, will trump the still-looming military assault.
The Turks are understandably angry and ready for war. Accumulated frustrations over recent attacks by the PKK erupted in public demands for a decisive military solution. Turkish popular opinion strongly supported attacks on rebel base camps inside Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Turkish armed forces have mobilised more than 100,000 troops on the Iraqi border, setting the stage for a massive Turkish invasion of northern Iraq that would have disastrous consequences.
On paper all wars seem simple. Turkish military planners may hope that one bold thrust into Iraqi Kurdistan will, once and for all, eradicate the PKK. A glance at what soldiers call the “troop-to-task” ratio might suggest that the job could be done quickly. Turkey has a very good army and it would seem feasible that 100,000 well-trained and fully equipped Turkish troops could quickly capture or kill 3,000 PKK rebels hiding in an area somewhat larger than Maryland.
But war is never simple. The friction and fog of war always conspire to make the actual combat far more complex, time consuming and bloodier than the sterile and optimistic plans written in the comfort of remote headquarters. Even a military genius like Alexander the Great was stalled by the inhospitable terrain of southern Turkey and northern Iraq. Despite popular longing for a quick military solution, a Turkish invasion of Iraq would bring only stalemate, frustration and – more ominously – destabilise the region, undermine US-Turkish relations for decades, and jeopardise the stability and prosperity of Iraq’s Kurdistan region.
Turkey will certainly benefit by continuing on the more creative and diplomatic path now being pursued by Mr Erdogan. He has secured a US promise to share intelligence and to co-operate in neutralising PKK elements in Iraq and preventing their movement across the border. He should open a dialogue with the KRG to formulate joint measures to prevent the PKK from striking Turkey from Iraqi territory. To that end, he needs to embrace the establishment of four-party talks between Turkey, Iraq, the US and the KRG. This must be the way forward.
War is not the answer, especially given the creative alternatives available. First, strike the PKK where they are vulnerable, not in the mountain base camps where they are strongest. Divide the enemy by crafting an amnesty that permits civilians and lower level PKK members to lay down their arms and rejoin society. This worked in Northern Ireland to isolate radical fringes of the Irish Republican Army and it will work here, where the PKK’s popular support at best is tepid.
Second, the US and others could cripple PKK operations by cutting off its financial support. PKK’s centre of power is not, and never has been, in Iraqi Kurdistan; its popular base lies in south-eastern Turkey. Its financial base is in the cities of continental Europe, where the money is raised. Its leaders travel freely in European capitals. A co-ordinated international effort is needed to interdict the flow of money and supplies to the PKK.
Decades of military action against the PKK have failed to produce a lasting solution and it would fail again. Albert Einstein was not a military strategist but he did know something about how to solve problems. He also recognised the folly of substituting haste for thoughtful, reasoned decision making when he said: “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
Dealing with the PKK is an essential element of resolving the larger conflict in Iraq and improving the peace in the region. This challenge requires a creative strategy, one rooted in diplomacy and dialogue. Most of all it requires leaders with vision who rise above raw emotion – courageous leaders who are willing to forego short-term violent actions in order to wisely serve their nation’s long term interests.
General Clark is a former supreme commander of Nato, led the alliance of military forces in the Kosovo war (1999) and is a senior fellow at the Ron Burkle Center at UCLA
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
"FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy policy | Terms
By Wesley Clark
November 15 2007 18:41 | Last updated: November 15 2007 18:41
Just over a week after US president George W. Bush and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, met in Washington, Turkish troops remained poised to move across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to destroy elements of the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK). We can only hope that a solution based on the idea of joint co-operation against the PKK that seemed to be forged in the Oval Office meeting, focusing on diplomatic engagement between the US, Turkey, Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, will trump the still-looming military assault.
The Turks are understandably angry and ready for war. Accumulated frustrations over recent attacks by the PKK erupted in public demands for a decisive military solution. Turkish popular opinion strongly supported attacks on rebel base camps inside Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Turkish armed forces have mobilised more than 100,000 troops on the Iraqi border, setting the stage for a massive Turkish invasion of northern Iraq that would have disastrous consequences.
On paper all wars seem simple. Turkish military planners may hope that one bold thrust into Iraqi Kurdistan will, once and for all, eradicate the PKK. A glance at what soldiers call the “troop-to-task” ratio might suggest that the job could be done quickly. Turkey has a very good army and it would seem feasible that 100,000 well-trained and fully equipped Turkish troops could quickly capture or kill 3,000 PKK rebels hiding in an area somewhat larger than Maryland.
But war is never simple. The friction and fog of war always conspire to make the actual combat far more complex, time consuming and bloodier than the sterile and optimistic plans written in the comfort of remote headquarters. Even a military genius like Alexander the Great was stalled by the inhospitable terrain of southern Turkey and northern Iraq. Despite popular longing for a quick military solution, a Turkish invasion of Iraq would bring only stalemate, frustration and – more ominously – destabilise the region, undermine US-Turkish relations for decades, and jeopardise the stability and prosperity of Iraq’s Kurdistan region.
Turkey will certainly benefit by continuing on the more creative and diplomatic path now being pursued by Mr Erdogan. He has secured a US promise to share intelligence and to co-operate in neutralising PKK elements in Iraq and preventing their movement across the border. He should open a dialogue with the KRG to formulate joint measures to prevent the PKK from striking Turkey from Iraqi territory. To that end, he needs to embrace the establishment of four-party talks between Turkey, Iraq, the US and the KRG. This must be the way forward.
War is not the answer, especially given the creative alternatives available. First, strike the PKK where they are vulnerable, not in the mountain base camps where they are strongest. Divide the enemy by crafting an amnesty that permits civilians and lower level PKK members to lay down their arms and rejoin society. This worked in Northern Ireland to isolate radical fringes of the Irish Republican Army and it will work here, where the PKK’s popular support at best is tepid.
Second, the US and others could cripple PKK operations by cutting off its financial support. PKK’s centre of power is not, and never has been, in Iraqi Kurdistan; its popular base lies in south-eastern Turkey. Its financial base is in the cities of continental Europe, where the money is raised. Its leaders travel freely in European capitals. A co-ordinated international effort is needed to interdict the flow of money and supplies to the PKK.
Decades of military action against the PKK have failed to produce a lasting solution and it would fail again. Albert Einstein was not a military strategist but he did know something about how to solve problems. He also recognised the folly of substituting haste for thoughtful, reasoned decision making when he said: “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
Dealing with the PKK is an essential element of resolving the larger conflict in Iraq and improving the peace in the region. This challenge requires a creative strategy, one rooted in diplomacy and dialogue. Most of all it requires leaders with vision who rise above raw emotion – courageous leaders who are willing to forego short-term violent actions in order to wisely serve their nation’s long term interests.
General Clark is a former supreme commander of Nato, led the alliance of military forces in the Kosovo war (1999) and is a senior fellow at the Ron Burkle Center at UCLA
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
"FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy policy | Terms
An eminence grise
Turkey's foreign policy
An eminence grise
Nov 15th 2007 | ISTANBUL
From The Economist print edition
The visionary behind Turkey's newly assertive foreign policy
SHIMON PERES became the first Israeli president to address the parliament of a Muslim country when he spoke to Turkish deputies on November 13th. “We may be saying different prayers, but our eyes are turned toward the same sky and toward the same vision for the Middle East,” he told an audience that included both the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Turkish one, Abdullah Gul.
For Turkey, this was an historic moment, a chance to reclaim the muscle of its Ottoman forebears as a force in the Middle East. Until a few years ago, Turkey, with its intimate ties with America and Israel, was scorned by its Arab neighbours as a Western stooge. The suppression of public expressions of Muslim piety decreed by Ataturk merely reinforced the canard that Turkey was run by crypto-Jews.
But this image has faded since the mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party came to power five years ago. Even as it pursued the goal of European Union membership, AK started to revive long-dormant ties with the Muslim world. Driving this multi-pronged vision is Ahmet Davutoglu, the self-effacing chief adviser on foreign policy to the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Disgruntled foreign-ministry officials discount Mr Davutoglu's behind-the-scenes influence, but it is unquestionably huge. Both Mr Erdogan and Mr Gul call him Hodja, or teacher. The former academic drew their attention in the mid-1980s with essays on Islam and the West. Ali Babacan, Turkey's young foreign minister, whom Mr Erdogan is rumoured to be grooming as his successor, takes Mr Davutoglu with him wherever he goes.
Critics accuse Mr Davutoglu of pulling away from the West. Never more so than when Turkey invited Hamas's leader, Khaled Meshal, just as Condoleezza Rice, America's secretary of state, was flying to the Middle East to tell Arab governments not to deal with Hamas after its Palestine election win in January 2006. Many see this as the biggest foreign-policy blunder of the Erdogan era. Sitting in his office in the Ottoman sultan's last palace, Dolmabahce, Mr Davutoglu disagrees. Was it not America that exhorted Hamas to take part in the election, he asks. “So why refuse to recognise its results?” Turkey's aim was to persuade Hamas to recognise Israel. Yet the affair had a toxic effect on Turkey's relations with America and Israel.
Born into a merchant family in the conservative city of Konya, Mr Davutoglu is unabashedly pious. He clawed his way into an elite Istanbul lycée, where he was educated in German. Mr Davutoglu rankled at having to read Western classics before touching Turkish ones. Why were Turkey's ideas imported from the West? Where was the great Turkish thinker?
Mr Davutoglu's desire to transform Turkey into a pivotal country in the region lies at the heart of his vision. Turkey was long perceived, he told a conference, “as having strong muscles, a weak stomach, a troubled heart and a mediocre brain.” Getting away from this means creating strong economic ties across Turkey's borders. Even as the Turks threaten separatist PKK rebels inside northern Iraq, business ties with the Iraqi Kurds flourish. Hawks who called for the expulsion of Armenian migrants when an American congressional committee passed a bill calling the mass slaughter of Ottoman Armenians “genocide” were overruled. At the same time Mr Davutoglu is an avid proponent of Turkey's membership of the EU. “Turkey can be European in Europe and eastern in the East, because we are both,” he insists.
The chaos in Iraq and the escalation of PKK attacks remain Turkey's biggest headaches. Yet here too Turkey is taking the initiative. On November 5th it hosted a conference of Iraq's neighbours that was attended by Ms Rice. A day later Mr Davutoglu flew to Washington with Mr Erdogan. He was one of a handful of Turks present at Mr Erdogan's talks with George Bush. Dealing with Turkish foreign policy means dealing with Mr Davutoglu.
An eminence grise
Nov 15th 2007 | ISTANBUL
From The Economist print edition
The visionary behind Turkey's newly assertive foreign policy
SHIMON PERES became the first Israeli president to address the parliament of a Muslim country when he spoke to Turkish deputies on November 13th. “We may be saying different prayers, but our eyes are turned toward the same sky and toward the same vision for the Middle East,” he told an audience that included both the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Turkish one, Abdullah Gul.
For Turkey, this was an historic moment, a chance to reclaim the muscle of its Ottoman forebears as a force in the Middle East. Until a few years ago, Turkey, with its intimate ties with America and Israel, was scorned by its Arab neighbours as a Western stooge. The suppression of public expressions of Muslim piety decreed by Ataturk merely reinforced the canard that Turkey was run by crypto-Jews.
But this image has faded since the mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party came to power five years ago. Even as it pursued the goal of European Union membership, AK started to revive long-dormant ties with the Muslim world. Driving this multi-pronged vision is Ahmet Davutoglu, the self-effacing chief adviser on foreign policy to the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Disgruntled foreign-ministry officials discount Mr Davutoglu's behind-the-scenes influence, but it is unquestionably huge. Both Mr Erdogan and Mr Gul call him Hodja, or teacher. The former academic drew their attention in the mid-1980s with essays on Islam and the West. Ali Babacan, Turkey's young foreign minister, whom Mr Erdogan is rumoured to be grooming as his successor, takes Mr Davutoglu with him wherever he goes.
Critics accuse Mr Davutoglu of pulling away from the West. Never more so than when Turkey invited Hamas's leader, Khaled Meshal, just as Condoleezza Rice, America's secretary of state, was flying to the Middle East to tell Arab governments not to deal with Hamas after its Palestine election win in January 2006. Many see this as the biggest foreign-policy blunder of the Erdogan era. Sitting in his office in the Ottoman sultan's last palace, Dolmabahce, Mr Davutoglu disagrees. Was it not America that exhorted Hamas to take part in the election, he asks. “So why refuse to recognise its results?” Turkey's aim was to persuade Hamas to recognise Israel. Yet the affair had a toxic effect on Turkey's relations with America and Israel.
Born into a merchant family in the conservative city of Konya, Mr Davutoglu is unabashedly pious. He clawed his way into an elite Istanbul lycée, where he was educated in German. Mr Davutoglu rankled at having to read Western classics before touching Turkish ones. Why were Turkey's ideas imported from the West? Where was the great Turkish thinker?
Mr Davutoglu's desire to transform Turkey into a pivotal country in the region lies at the heart of his vision. Turkey was long perceived, he told a conference, “as having strong muscles, a weak stomach, a troubled heart and a mediocre brain.” Getting away from this means creating strong economic ties across Turkey's borders. Even as the Turks threaten separatist PKK rebels inside northern Iraq, business ties with the Iraqi Kurds flourish. Hawks who called for the expulsion of Armenian migrants when an American congressional committee passed a bill calling the mass slaughter of Ottoman Armenians “genocide” were overruled. At the same time Mr Davutoglu is an avid proponent of Turkey's membership of the EU. “Turkey can be European in Europe and eastern in the East, because we are both,” he insists.
The chaos in Iraq and the escalation of PKK attacks remain Turkey's biggest headaches. Yet here too Turkey is taking the initiative. On November 5th it hosted a conference of Iraq's neighbours that was attended by Ms Rice. A day later Mr Davutoglu flew to Washington with Mr Erdogan. He was one of a handful of Turks present at Mr Erdogan's talks with George Bush. Dealing with Turkish foreign policy means dealing with Mr Davutoglu.
FEATURE-Turkey's village guards face danger from all sides
Reuters - Wed Nov 14, 2007 1:18am EST
By Thomas Grove
HILAL, Turkey, Nov 14 (Reuters) - With a rifle slung around his neck, Sadik Babat points to where his house stood before being destroyed in Turkey's scorched-earth campaign in the 1990s against villages suspected of supporting Kurdish separatists.
Babat, a Turkish Kurd, is an unlikely figure to be working as one of 57,000 state-sponsored village guards throughout Turkey's southeast, acting as a guide and fighting the Kurdish rebels alongside the same army that destroyed his home.
But with recent legislation aimed at boosting their numbers by the thousands and a possible cross-border operation into Iraq looming, these villagers, labelled traitors by many of their kin, may become more important than ever to Turkey's military.
Ankara has amassed 100,000 troops on its border with Iraq and threatened a cross-border offensive to crack down on rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based in mainly Kurdish northern Iraq.
The army says the village guards' knowledge of this remote mountainous terrain is key to operations in guerrilla warfare.
"I've probably participated in more than 500 operations over the last 21 years. At the end of some I've been the last one standing, and there have been times when I've shot and killed, too," Babat said loading his rifle in a single, fluid motion.
The PKK took up arms against the Turkish state in 1984 with the aim of creating an ethnic Kurdish homeland in the southeast. Nearly 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict.
Officially the guards are part of a controversial policy established in 1985 to set up a paramilitary force to protect villages against PKK attacks, patrol the rugged mountains and help fight the separatists.
But their right to carry arms, to inform on suspected separatist activities and to kill in the name of the state has made them a force within the region, while critics say they use their status to settle family scores and take over land.
UNACCOUNTABLE FORCE
"They are an armed and unaccountable force and the rules by which they are governed are very ill defined, so they can get away with murder, theft," said Emma Sinclair-Webb, a researcher on Turkey for U.S.-based Human Rights Watch.
Since the system's implementation, 4,972 guards have committed recorded crimes, while 853 have been imprisoned, according to parliamentary records.
The guards have also been criticised in the latest European Union progress report, which says their armed presence has hampered the efforts of displaced villagers to return to their homes in the southeast.
One village guard walking his donkey on a border road said there is little love for him and his fellow guards.
"If they ever take my gun away the first thing that will happen is I'll get hung in the village square," said the man who gave only his first name as Cinsi.
In the southeast, Turkey's military -- the second largest in NATO -- has always said the decision to join the guards is voluntary, but villagers say their decision to sign up has been accompanied by force.
Even Babat acknowledges the contradiction of working with the army that destroyed his own village of Hilal, and says he joined purely out of pragmatism.
"When they destroyed our village, some people joined the PKK, others fled to northern Iraq. If you wanted to stay you had to become a village guard," said Babat, looking over the river that once ran through Hilal.
Village guards say the 500 lira ($424) monthly salary also draws enlistments in the country's poorest region.
With participation largely dictated by economics or force, loyalties can be uncertain and telling friend from foe can be difficult and dangerous.
Babat, like other guards, carries his rifle everywhere he goes -- slung over his shoulder at the grocer's or walking along the mountain roads -- to defend against both members of the PKK and intelligence services who may think he is a double agent.
In October six guards working in the area were arrested for informing the PKK about army operations, security sources said.
"There has always been informing. That's nothing new. I've known people that have worked both sides for years. With the things that happen out here ... sometimes you know that someone is informing," said Babat.
With Turkey's top general saying they are waiting for orders for a cross-border operation, village guards say they do not want an even greater military presence in their backyard.
But Babat says he will fight if the need arises.
"I'm not afraid, there's no fear in me. If I meet a terrorist on the road, I'll shoot and I'll make sure I'm the last one standing." (Editing by Stephen Weeks)
By Thomas Grove
HILAL, Turkey, Nov 14 (Reuters) - With a rifle slung around his neck, Sadik Babat points to where his house stood before being destroyed in Turkey's scorched-earth campaign in the 1990s against villages suspected of supporting Kurdish separatists.
Babat, a Turkish Kurd, is an unlikely figure to be working as one of 57,000 state-sponsored village guards throughout Turkey's southeast, acting as a guide and fighting the Kurdish rebels alongside the same army that destroyed his home.
But with recent legislation aimed at boosting their numbers by the thousands and a possible cross-border operation into Iraq looming, these villagers, labelled traitors by many of their kin, may become more important than ever to Turkey's military.
Ankara has amassed 100,000 troops on its border with Iraq and threatened a cross-border offensive to crack down on rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based in mainly Kurdish northern Iraq.
The army says the village guards' knowledge of this remote mountainous terrain is key to operations in guerrilla warfare.
"I've probably participated in more than 500 operations over the last 21 years. At the end of some I've been the last one standing, and there have been times when I've shot and killed, too," Babat said loading his rifle in a single, fluid motion.
The PKK took up arms against the Turkish state in 1984 with the aim of creating an ethnic Kurdish homeland in the southeast. Nearly 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict.
Officially the guards are part of a controversial policy established in 1985 to set up a paramilitary force to protect villages against PKK attacks, patrol the rugged mountains and help fight the separatists.
But their right to carry arms, to inform on suspected separatist activities and to kill in the name of the state has made them a force within the region, while critics say they use their status to settle family scores and take over land.
UNACCOUNTABLE FORCE
"They are an armed and unaccountable force and the rules by which they are governed are very ill defined, so they can get away with murder, theft," said Emma Sinclair-Webb, a researcher on Turkey for U.S.-based Human Rights Watch.
Since the system's implementation, 4,972 guards have committed recorded crimes, while 853 have been imprisoned, according to parliamentary records.
The guards have also been criticised in the latest European Union progress report, which says their armed presence has hampered the efforts of displaced villagers to return to their homes in the southeast.
One village guard walking his donkey on a border road said there is little love for him and his fellow guards.
"If they ever take my gun away the first thing that will happen is I'll get hung in the village square," said the man who gave only his first name as Cinsi.
In the southeast, Turkey's military -- the second largest in NATO -- has always said the decision to join the guards is voluntary, but villagers say their decision to sign up has been accompanied by force.
Even Babat acknowledges the contradiction of working with the army that destroyed his own village of Hilal, and says he joined purely out of pragmatism.
"When they destroyed our village, some people joined the PKK, others fled to northern Iraq. If you wanted to stay you had to become a village guard," said Babat, looking over the river that once ran through Hilal.
Village guards say the 500 lira ($424) monthly salary also draws enlistments in the country's poorest region.
With participation largely dictated by economics or force, loyalties can be uncertain and telling friend from foe can be difficult and dangerous.
Babat, like other guards, carries his rifle everywhere he goes -- slung over his shoulder at the grocer's or walking along the mountain roads -- to defend against both members of the PKK and intelligence services who may think he is a double agent.
In October six guards working in the area were arrested for informing the PKK about army operations, security sources said.
"There has always been informing. That's nothing new. I've known people that have worked both sides for years. With the things that happen out here ... sometimes you know that someone is informing," said Babat.
With Turkey's top general saying they are waiting for orders for a cross-border operation, village guards say they do not want an even greater military presence in their backyard.
But Babat says he will fight if the need arises.
"I'm not afraid, there's no fear in me. If I meet a terrorist on the road, I'll shoot and I'll make sure I'm the last one standing." (Editing by Stephen Weeks)
Turkey’s Choice with Barzani: The Gun or the Olive Branch
Turkey’s Choice with Barzani: The Gun or the Olive Branch
Jamestown Foundation / GTA - By David Romano
Shortly after the Turkish National Assembly passed a resolution authorizing the Turkish army to enter northern Iraq, President Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) replied: “If they invade there will be war.” Barzani added: “We are not a threat to Turkey and I do not accept the language of threatening and blackmailing from the government of Turkey” (The Independent, October 29). Barzani was also unwilling to contemplate a Turkish demand that he send his own KRG troops to fight PKK militants operating out of the extremely mountainous terrain of northeastern Iraq, insisting that his “main mission would be not to allow a Kurdish-Kurdish fight to happen within the Kurdish liberation movement.” President Barzani’s statements, and particularly his implicit reference to the PKK as part of “the Kurdish liberation movement,” inflamed Turkish nationalist sentiment, but played well amongst Iraqi Kurds. Barzani also provoked fury in Turkey in April, when he stated that if Turkey has the right to involve itself in the Kirkuk issue, Iraqi Kurds have the right to involve themselves in Diyarbakir, the largest predominantly Kurdish city in Turkey (Hurriyet, April 8). Turkish media reacts quickly to any such statements, and Barzani’s name regularly makes the front page of mass circulation Turkish newspapers, although never preceded with honorific titles such as “Mr.” or “President.”
Since Barzani became president of the KRG and his fellow Kurd and erstwhile rival Jalal Talabani became president of Iraq, the former made public statements that have tended to be more confrontational towards Turkey, while the latter appears to have pursued a more diplomatic discourse with Ankara. Part of the explanation for this difference may come from the fact that KRG President Barzani views his role as catering more to the sensibilities of his Iraqi Kurdish constituents, while Iraqi President Talabani tries to represent all of Iraq. Another part of the explanation may be more personal, however: As President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani receives full Turkish recognition and all the respect due a head of state. In contrast, Turkish media and government officials have consistently snubbed Massoud Barzani, refusing to refer to him as “President,” unwilling to accord him diplomatic honors or dialogue with high Turkish officials, and apparently reluctant to even say “Kurdistan Regional Government.” In an interview with the Turkish newspaper Milliyet on October 30, after insisting that he was a friend of Turkey and desired good relations, Barzani asked: “You [Turkey] do not talk to me in an official capacity. You do not accept me as a partner for talks. You do not maintain a dialogue with me. Then suddenly you want me to take action for you against the PKK? Is this a way to do things?”
Governments may conduct politics and diplomacy, but governments are made up of people, and people want recognition and respect from one another. So while Iraqi Kurdish leaders such as Jalal Talabani, Hoshyar Zebari (Iraq’s foreign minister), Barham Salih (Iraq’s deputy prime minister) and Nechirvan Barzani (the KRG’s prime minister) try to smooth over disputes with Ankara, President Barzani may increasingly see himself as the repository of Iraqi Kurdish pride and dignity in the face of Turkish bullying.
In the October 30 interview with Milliyet, Barzani went on to question whether or not a Turkish military incursion into Iraq would really be aimed at the PKK, given that many such incursions failed in the 1990s. He suggested that perhaps Turkey was more interested in targeting Iraqi Kurdistan as a whole, despite the region’s desire for friendly relations with Turkey. If the Turkish government is indeed intent on targeting Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, then Barzani may reason that nothing will dissuade it, and there is no point in submitting to Ankara or taking the difficult steps needed to contain the PKK militants based in his region. Asked about what would happen if Turkey enacted an embargo on Iraqi Kurdistan, Barzani replied: “We would not starve” (The Independent, October 29).
Nonetheless, President Barzani is well aware of land-locked Iraqi Kurdistan’s dependence on Turkey for trade, investment (80% of which comes from Turkey) and an outlet to the world. The KRG’s peshmerga militias are no match for the second largest army in NATO, although together with the PKK they could certainly wage a mountain-based guerrilla war and exact a very heavy toll on Turkish forces. Barzani wishes to avoid a conflict with Turkey, although not at any price. He has ordered stricter measures to deny PKK militants freedom of movement and ease of supply in Iraqi Kurdistan. His prime minister and nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, published an op-ed in the November 5 issue of the Washington Post calling for peaceful relations and cooperation between Turkey and the KRG, insisting that the PKK is friend to neither.
Either a military confrontation or an economic embargo would cost Turkey dearly. Turkey’s military knows that it cannot completely dislodge the PKK from the extremely rugged mountains near the border, and an embargo on the KRG would impact Turkey’s economically depressed and volatile Kurdish southeast almost as negatively as it would Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkish companies are also doing brisk business in Iraqi Kurdistan. Such considerations are leading prominent voices in Turkey to begin suggesting that Ankara change its approach and embrace Iraqi Kurdistan. Deniz Baykal, leader of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), recently stated that Turkey should strengthen its trade and friendly relations with northern Iraq as part of a more sustainable way of reducing terrorism in the long-term (Hurriyet, November 10). Influential Turkish columnist Mehmet Ali Birand likewise advocates a new approach towards KRG President Barzani: “Massoud Barzani eats at the White House with President Bush. Then he goes to the European Parliament and has lunch with the representatives. He even tours Europe and makes friends with leaders. What does he find when goes back home? Turkey calls him a tribal chieftain. He is refused admittance. He's treated as a nobody. This is the attitude that upsets Massoud Barzani most and goads him into protecting the PKK” (Turkish Daily News, November 10).
Should Turkey’s political and military leadership recognize Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and begin treating KRG leaders with the same level of respect they accord to Turkish Cypriot leaders, the new approach might go a long way towards reassuring Iraqi Kurds and fostering the kind of relationship necessary for cooperation against PKK incursions.
Jamestown Foundation / GTA - By David Romano
Shortly after the Turkish National Assembly passed a resolution authorizing the Turkish army to enter northern Iraq, President Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) replied: “If they invade there will be war.” Barzani added: “We are not a threat to Turkey and I do not accept the language of threatening and blackmailing from the government of Turkey” (The Independent, October 29). Barzani was also unwilling to contemplate a Turkish demand that he send his own KRG troops to fight PKK militants operating out of the extremely mountainous terrain of northeastern Iraq, insisting that his “main mission would be not to allow a Kurdish-Kurdish fight to happen within the Kurdish liberation movement.” President Barzani’s statements, and particularly his implicit reference to the PKK as part of “the Kurdish liberation movement,” inflamed Turkish nationalist sentiment, but played well amongst Iraqi Kurds. Barzani also provoked fury in Turkey in April, when he stated that if Turkey has the right to involve itself in the Kirkuk issue, Iraqi Kurds have the right to involve themselves in Diyarbakir, the largest predominantly Kurdish city in Turkey (Hurriyet, April 8). Turkish media reacts quickly to any such statements, and Barzani’s name regularly makes the front page of mass circulation Turkish newspapers, although never preceded with honorific titles such as “Mr.” or “President.”
Since Barzani became president of the KRG and his fellow Kurd and erstwhile rival Jalal Talabani became president of Iraq, the former made public statements that have tended to be more confrontational towards Turkey, while the latter appears to have pursued a more diplomatic discourse with Ankara. Part of the explanation for this difference may come from the fact that KRG President Barzani views his role as catering more to the sensibilities of his Iraqi Kurdish constituents, while Iraqi President Talabani tries to represent all of Iraq. Another part of the explanation may be more personal, however: As President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani receives full Turkish recognition and all the respect due a head of state. In contrast, Turkish media and government officials have consistently snubbed Massoud Barzani, refusing to refer to him as “President,” unwilling to accord him diplomatic honors or dialogue with high Turkish officials, and apparently reluctant to even say “Kurdistan Regional Government.” In an interview with the Turkish newspaper Milliyet on October 30, after insisting that he was a friend of Turkey and desired good relations, Barzani asked: “You [Turkey] do not talk to me in an official capacity. You do not accept me as a partner for talks. You do not maintain a dialogue with me. Then suddenly you want me to take action for you against the PKK? Is this a way to do things?”
Governments may conduct politics and diplomacy, but governments are made up of people, and people want recognition and respect from one another. So while Iraqi Kurdish leaders such as Jalal Talabani, Hoshyar Zebari (Iraq’s foreign minister), Barham Salih (Iraq’s deputy prime minister) and Nechirvan Barzani (the KRG’s prime minister) try to smooth over disputes with Ankara, President Barzani may increasingly see himself as the repository of Iraqi Kurdish pride and dignity in the face of Turkish bullying.
In the October 30 interview with Milliyet, Barzani went on to question whether or not a Turkish military incursion into Iraq would really be aimed at the PKK, given that many such incursions failed in the 1990s. He suggested that perhaps Turkey was more interested in targeting Iraqi Kurdistan as a whole, despite the region’s desire for friendly relations with Turkey. If the Turkish government is indeed intent on targeting Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, then Barzani may reason that nothing will dissuade it, and there is no point in submitting to Ankara or taking the difficult steps needed to contain the PKK militants based in his region. Asked about what would happen if Turkey enacted an embargo on Iraqi Kurdistan, Barzani replied: “We would not starve” (The Independent, October 29).
Nonetheless, President Barzani is well aware of land-locked Iraqi Kurdistan’s dependence on Turkey for trade, investment (80% of which comes from Turkey) and an outlet to the world. The KRG’s peshmerga militias are no match for the second largest army in NATO, although together with the PKK they could certainly wage a mountain-based guerrilla war and exact a very heavy toll on Turkish forces. Barzani wishes to avoid a conflict with Turkey, although not at any price. He has ordered stricter measures to deny PKK militants freedom of movement and ease of supply in Iraqi Kurdistan. His prime minister and nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, published an op-ed in the November 5 issue of the Washington Post calling for peaceful relations and cooperation between Turkey and the KRG, insisting that the PKK is friend to neither.
Either a military confrontation or an economic embargo would cost Turkey dearly. Turkey’s military knows that it cannot completely dislodge the PKK from the extremely rugged mountains near the border, and an embargo on the KRG would impact Turkey’s economically depressed and volatile Kurdish southeast almost as negatively as it would Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkish companies are also doing brisk business in Iraqi Kurdistan. Such considerations are leading prominent voices in Turkey to begin suggesting that Ankara change its approach and embrace Iraqi Kurdistan. Deniz Baykal, leader of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), recently stated that Turkey should strengthen its trade and friendly relations with northern Iraq as part of a more sustainable way of reducing terrorism in the long-term (Hurriyet, November 10). Influential Turkish columnist Mehmet Ali Birand likewise advocates a new approach towards KRG President Barzani: “Massoud Barzani eats at the White House with President Bush. Then he goes to the European Parliament and has lunch with the representatives. He even tours Europe and makes friends with leaders. What does he find when goes back home? Turkey calls him a tribal chieftain. He is refused admittance. He's treated as a nobody. This is the attitude that upsets Massoud Barzani most and goads him into protecting the PKK” (Turkish Daily News, November 10).
Should Turkey’s political and military leadership recognize Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and begin treating KRG leaders with the same level of respect they accord to Turkish Cypriot leaders, the new approach might go a long way towards reassuring Iraqi Kurds and fostering the kind of relationship necessary for cooperation against PKK incursions.
U.S. Sharing Intelligence With Turkey
NYT- November 15, 2007
U.S. Sharing Intelligence With Turkey
By SEBNEM ARSU
IZMIR, Turkey, Nov 14 — The United States has begun to share real-time intelligence with Turkey to assist in its efforts to track down separatist Kurdish rebels hiding in northern Iraq, Ali Babacan, the Turkish foreign minister said on Wednesday.
President Bush, in his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan early this month, agreed to share intelligence for surgical strikes in combat against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or PKK, in order to avoid a larger-scale invasion by Turkey.
“Following the authorization of President Bush, all units started to act in accordance with a new approach and ordering,” Mr. Babacan said, speaking to semiofficial Anatolian Agency.
Speaking of Turkey’s past struggles with a lack of real-time intelligence, Mr. Babacan added, “Orders are given to prevent such recurrences. Implementation is important, we will see how implementation goes in the period ahead.”
The PKK, seeking autonomy in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast, has recently escalated attacks. Turkey’s Parliament responded to these raids in October by approving permission for cross-border operations into Iraq to eliminate the rebels’ hideouts.
The United States and Iraq oppose a major Turkish military movement in the region and strongly suggest diplomatic ways to resolve the conflict, while Turkey has been demanding immediate tangible steps by both countries to neutralize the PKK.
The fighting has continued as the various governments have sought a solution. On Tuesday Kurdish rebels killed four soldiers and wounded nine others during clashes in mountainous areas of Sirnak Province in southeastern Turkey. Several news services indicated that Turkish planes attacked empty Iraqi villages during the fighting.
Gen. Aydogan Babaoglu, the Turkish Air Force commander, denied news reports that Turkish fighter jets had engaged in any cross-border operation during those clashes. “I don’t know how the press comes up with such news,” General Babaoglu said, speaking to the semiofficial Anatolian News Agency in northern Cyprus.
“This news item has been appearing almost in every television network since yesterday afternoon. I was on duty at that time, and not a single plane of the Turkish Air Force was engaged in any kind of operation. There’s nothing like that. Such news absolutely have no grounds.”
U.S. Sharing Intelligence With Turkey
By SEBNEM ARSU
IZMIR, Turkey, Nov 14 — The United States has begun to share real-time intelligence with Turkey to assist in its efforts to track down separatist Kurdish rebels hiding in northern Iraq, Ali Babacan, the Turkish foreign minister said on Wednesday.
President Bush, in his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan early this month, agreed to share intelligence for surgical strikes in combat against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or PKK, in order to avoid a larger-scale invasion by Turkey.
“Following the authorization of President Bush, all units started to act in accordance with a new approach and ordering,” Mr. Babacan said, speaking to semiofficial Anatolian Agency.
Speaking of Turkey’s past struggles with a lack of real-time intelligence, Mr. Babacan added, “Orders are given to prevent such recurrences. Implementation is important, we will see how implementation goes in the period ahead.”
The PKK, seeking autonomy in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast, has recently escalated attacks. Turkey’s Parliament responded to these raids in October by approving permission for cross-border operations into Iraq to eliminate the rebels’ hideouts.
The United States and Iraq oppose a major Turkish military movement in the region and strongly suggest diplomatic ways to resolve the conflict, while Turkey has been demanding immediate tangible steps by both countries to neutralize the PKK.
The fighting has continued as the various governments have sought a solution. On Tuesday Kurdish rebels killed four soldiers and wounded nine others during clashes in mountainous areas of Sirnak Province in southeastern Turkey. Several news services indicated that Turkish planes attacked empty Iraqi villages during the fighting.
Gen. Aydogan Babaoglu, the Turkish Air Force commander, denied news reports that Turkish fighter jets had engaged in any cross-border operation during those clashes. “I don’t know how the press comes up with such news,” General Babaoglu said, speaking to the semiofficial Anatolian News Agency in northern Cyprus.
“This news item has been appearing almost in every television network since yesterday afternoon. I was on duty at that time, and not a single plane of the Turkish Air Force was engaged in any kind of operation. There’s nothing like that. Such news absolutely have no grounds.”
Turkey Seeks Arrest of Rebel Commanders
GUARDIAN - Wednesday November 7, 2007 11:31 AM
By CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA
ISTANBUL, Turkey (AP) - The jailed chief of Turkey's Kurdish rebels remains a powerful symbol for fighters who revere him with a personality cult. But the guerrilla lieutenants who plot tactics from bases in northern Iraq are coming under increasing scrutiny as Turkey presses Iraq and the United States for their arrest.
They include Murat Karayilan and Cemil Bayik, veteran commanders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, who may have authorized recent attacks that pushed Turkey close to ordering a cross-border offensive against rebel shelters in Iraq. Another prominent rebel is Fehman Huseyin, believed to be the top field commander of the PKK's military wing.
On Monday, President Bush met Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Washington and promised him that the United States would share military intelligence in the hunt for PKK rebels. Turkey credited U.S. help in the 1999 capture in Kenya of Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK who is now serving a life sentence on a prison island in Turkey.
Without providing names, the Pentagon also has said 10 PKK members are in a U.S. ``most-wanted'' database, meaning American forces have had standing orders for some time to pick them up if they are found. Citing Iraqi officials, Turkish media have said Turkey delivered a list of 150 alleged PKK members to Iraq and demanded their extradition.
The PKK, which launched guerrilla warfare in 1984, started out with a Marxist ideology mixed with Kurdish nationalism, but it later softened its demands and dropped the idea of an independent homeland. The rebels now say they seek more rights for Turkey's Kurdish minority, which lives primarily in the country's southeast and in immigrant communities in large cities.
The United States and Europe label the PKK as a terrorist organization. Turkey dismisses the group as a murderous gang and refuses to negotiate with it.
Ocalan drew comparisons with Stalin for his harsh control over the group, often killing or imprisoning members who deviated from his edicts. His presence still permeates the PKK, which displays his image on banners and demands his release, though factions developed as commanders debated whether to seek war or peace. Ocalan's brother, Osman, was a PKK leader who quit the group several years ago.
Other individuals accused of being PKK decision-makers are Duran Kalkan, Riza Altun and Zubeyir Aydar, a lawmaker ejected from the Turkish parliament in 1994.
The leadership council of the PKK is based at Mount Qandil, which straddles the Iraq-Iran border and is 60 miles from the frontier between Iraq and Turkey. It has links with organizers in Europe who provide funds, allegedly through illegal activities such as drug-running.
Some suspects have traveled extensively in Europe, angering Turkish authorities who say countries there should do more to restrict rebel activities among their large Kurdish populations. And in recent months, PKK commanders have spoken to foreign journalists who travel to their sanctuaries, triggering criticism of Iraqi leaders for their failure to crack down on the group.
Karayilan, a PKK leader in his 50s who wears an olive green uniform, is a key figure in the current tension over whether Turkey will attack rebels in northern Iraq despite U.S. and Iraqi calls for restraint.
On Sunday, shortly after the PKK released eight abducted Turkish soldiers, Karayilan delivered an appeal directed at the United States for a peaceful solution to what he called the ``Kurdish question.'' But because of the PKK's terrorist label, the guerrilla commander's plea was unlikely to win the international recognition he seeks.
Aliza Marcus, author of a book titled ``Blood and Belief: the PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence,'' described Karayilan as an experienced military fighter and more of an independent thinker in an organization where anyone who opposed Ocalan risked ostracism or death in an internal purge.
``He can see sort of two steps ahead,'' Marcus said. ``The other guys are more 'yes' men. They're not people who can think outside the box.''
Turkey believes Karayilan has virtually run the PKK since Ocalan, who sets the tone for the rebel group with appeals for peace and Kurdish rights, gave consent to the guerrilla leaders to determine operational details on their own because he cannot do so from his cell.
Ocalan delivered a message through his lawyers last week in which he said the PKK leadership at Mount Qandil ``should not act under orders from anyone; it should make its own decisions itself,'' the pro-Kurdish Firat news agency reported.
Bayik, another longtime leader of the PKK, attended its inaugural congress in 1978 and was named deputy secretary general. Testimony during Ocalan's 1999 trial referred to Bayik's presence in training camps in Lebanon and Syria, and to his role in transferring money to the PKK from Europe. He is also believed to have spent time in Iran.
Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd also known as ``Doctor Bahoz,'' is in charge of the People's Defense Forces, the armed wing of the PKK. Turkey's Hurriyet newspaper reported in January that Huseyin gave a speech to PKK members at that time in which he exhorted them to follow orders from commanders and repeatedly reminded them that they were at war.
Hurriyet said the speech was in Kurdish, but was translated into Turkish for broadcast over wireless radios. The Turkish military sometimes intercepts rebel communications and leaks their contents to Turkish media.
``He's one of the younger guys, he's not a member of the leadership council,'' said Ali Koknar, a Turkish security consultant based in Washington. ``He has proven himself in combat.''
By CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA
ISTANBUL, Turkey (AP) - The jailed chief of Turkey's Kurdish rebels remains a powerful symbol for fighters who revere him with a personality cult. But the guerrilla lieutenants who plot tactics from bases in northern Iraq are coming under increasing scrutiny as Turkey presses Iraq and the United States for their arrest.
They include Murat Karayilan and Cemil Bayik, veteran commanders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, who may have authorized recent attacks that pushed Turkey close to ordering a cross-border offensive against rebel shelters in Iraq. Another prominent rebel is Fehman Huseyin, believed to be the top field commander of the PKK's military wing.
On Monday, President Bush met Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Washington and promised him that the United States would share military intelligence in the hunt for PKK rebels. Turkey credited U.S. help in the 1999 capture in Kenya of Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK who is now serving a life sentence on a prison island in Turkey.
Without providing names, the Pentagon also has said 10 PKK members are in a U.S. ``most-wanted'' database, meaning American forces have had standing orders for some time to pick them up if they are found. Citing Iraqi officials, Turkish media have said Turkey delivered a list of 150 alleged PKK members to Iraq and demanded their extradition.
The PKK, which launched guerrilla warfare in 1984, started out with a Marxist ideology mixed with Kurdish nationalism, but it later softened its demands and dropped the idea of an independent homeland. The rebels now say they seek more rights for Turkey's Kurdish minority, which lives primarily in the country's southeast and in immigrant communities in large cities.
The United States and Europe label the PKK as a terrorist organization. Turkey dismisses the group as a murderous gang and refuses to negotiate with it.
Ocalan drew comparisons with Stalin for his harsh control over the group, often killing or imprisoning members who deviated from his edicts. His presence still permeates the PKK, which displays his image on banners and demands his release, though factions developed as commanders debated whether to seek war or peace. Ocalan's brother, Osman, was a PKK leader who quit the group several years ago.
Other individuals accused of being PKK decision-makers are Duran Kalkan, Riza Altun and Zubeyir Aydar, a lawmaker ejected from the Turkish parliament in 1994.
The leadership council of the PKK is based at Mount Qandil, which straddles the Iraq-Iran border and is 60 miles from the frontier between Iraq and Turkey. It has links with organizers in Europe who provide funds, allegedly through illegal activities such as drug-running.
Some suspects have traveled extensively in Europe, angering Turkish authorities who say countries there should do more to restrict rebel activities among their large Kurdish populations. And in recent months, PKK commanders have spoken to foreign journalists who travel to their sanctuaries, triggering criticism of Iraqi leaders for their failure to crack down on the group.
Karayilan, a PKK leader in his 50s who wears an olive green uniform, is a key figure in the current tension over whether Turkey will attack rebels in northern Iraq despite U.S. and Iraqi calls for restraint.
On Sunday, shortly after the PKK released eight abducted Turkish soldiers, Karayilan delivered an appeal directed at the United States for a peaceful solution to what he called the ``Kurdish question.'' But because of the PKK's terrorist label, the guerrilla commander's plea was unlikely to win the international recognition he seeks.
Aliza Marcus, author of a book titled ``Blood and Belief: the PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence,'' described Karayilan as an experienced military fighter and more of an independent thinker in an organization where anyone who opposed Ocalan risked ostracism or death in an internal purge.
``He can see sort of two steps ahead,'' Marcus said. ``The other guys are more 'yes' men. They're not people who can think outside the box.''
Turkey believes Karayilan has virtually run the PKK since Ocalan, who sets the tone for the rebel group with appeals for peace and Kurdish rights, gave consent to the guerrilla leaders to determine operational details on their own because he cannot do so from his cell.
Ocalan delivered a message through his lawyers last week in which he said the PKK leadership at Mount Qandil ``should not act under orders from anyone; it should make its own decisions itself,'' the pro-Kurdish Firat news agency reported.
Bayik, another longtime leader of the PKK, attended its inaugural congress in 1978 and was named deputy secretary general. Testimony during Ocalan's 1999 trial referred to Bayik's presence in training camps in Lebanon and Syria, and to his role in transferring money to the PKK from Europe. He is also believed to have spent time in Iran.
Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd also known as ``Doctor Bahoz,'' is in charge of the People's Defense Forces, the armed wing of the PKK. Turkey's Hurriyet newspaper reported in January that Huseyin gave a speech to PKK members at that time in which he exhorted them to follow orders from commanders and repeatedly reminded them that they were at war.
Hurriyet said the speech was in Kurdish, but was translated into Turkish for broadcast over wireless radios. The Turkish military sometimes intercepts rebel communications and leaks their contents to Turkish media.
``He's one of the younger guys, he's not a member of the leadership council,'' said Ali Koknar, a Turkish security consultant based in Washington. ``He has proven himself in combat.''
Carroll: For Turkey, the war
International Herald Tribune-Tuesday, November 6, 2007
By James Carroll
ISTANBUL: Here in Turkey, Condoleezza Rice offered sage advice to Turkish leaders ahead of the Washington meeting between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan. "Effective action means action that can deal with the threat," she said Friday, but won't "make the situation worse."
The Turkish military, with a deployed force of up to 100,000 soldiers, is poised to attack positions of militant Kurdish separatist fighters in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq. Their cross-border forays into Turkey over the last five weeks have killed dozens of Turks, both soldiers and civilians. Iraqi Kurds tacitly support their fellow Kurds, and Americans have done nothing to dissuade either group. Erdogan is under enormous pressure to respond to such attacks, but Rice highlighted "the need to look for an effective strategy, not just one that's going to strike out, somehow, and not deal with the problem."
As viewed from Turkey, American responses throughout this crisis range from duplicity to double standards. The cautionary message that Rice conveyed to her Foreign Ministry counterparts here, and that Bush is expected to echo, defines the exact opposite of policies pursued to this day by the Bush administration itself. The conditions that created the terrible prospect facing Turkey - an immediate war with rebel Kurds based in Iraq - have been wholly manufactured in Washington, which displays an unending capacity to "make the situation worse." Turkey, a staunch U.S. ally, urged restraint four-and-a-half years ago when Bush rolled his dice in Iraq. But when the gamble was lost, it was nations in the Middle East - not America - that paid. Turkey's turn to pony up has come.
The mood here is somber because when war begins, it will be real. Turks understand that the United States, thousands of miles away, is only virtually at war. U.S. soldiers are killing and being killed, to be sure. Yet the main result of their presence as an occupation force has been to ignite and sustain a set of civil wars - now including Turkey's - that have nothing to do with America. Indeed, despite the neocon rhetoric of "fight them there instead of here," the U.S. occupation of Iraq defends against no direct threat to America. As Saddam's weapons of mass destruction were a paranoid myth, so is the much-hyped dread of "Islamofascism," a phenomenon that, if it did exist, would threaten Islamic peoples and values far more than anything in the West. The problem, of course, is that militant Islamic extremists, however defined, are empowered by the U.S. occupation, not disarmed. Iraq has become a West Point for suicide bombers. Even then, the threat remains local. And although all the belligerents target the American occupiers, and will do so as long as the occupation continues, America has no authentic enemy among Iraq's sectarian belligerents. Turkey does.
In the United States, meanwhile, confusion reigns. After effectively voting against the Iraq occupation last November; after denouncing it in successive polls; after seeing the Bush administration reject its own review panel's call for a shift to diplomacy; after the touted "surge" led to more of the same; after the shock of current oil prices made the real Bush agenda in Iraq plainer ever; and after Dick Cheney and George W. Bush made the mad prospect of attack on Iran seem possible - the American public has sunk into a dispirited, and perhaps guilt-induced, detachment from the entire mess. (Again last week, Congressional Democrats, debating appropriations, dared look the Pentagon in the eye - and promptly blinked.) No such detachment is possible here in Turkey.
Before Bush's war changed everything in this region, Turkish hopes were high. An expansive European Union beckoned. Turks were poised to play a historic role as the bridge between Islam and the West. But then they found that, in the "us-against-them" war on terror, no such bridge was wanted. Europe got nervous about Turks already in its cities, and lately European countries have taken actions Turkey regards as friendly to the Kurdish rebels it is fighting. Now come warnings that, if Turkey responds to its made-in-Washington terror threat exactly as Washington does - "to strike out, somehow" - then Turkey can kiss EU admission goodbye.
The question is sharper in the United States: How much higher can the rubble pile of Bush's wreckage mount before Americans emerge from the stupor of shame to stop him?
James Carroll's column appears regularly in The Boston Globe.
By James Carroll
ISTANBUL: Here in Turkey, Condoleezza Rice offered sage advice to Turkish leaders ahead of the Washington meeting between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan. "Effective action means action that can deal with the threat," she said Friday, but won't "make the situation worse."
The Turkish military, with a deployed force of up to 100,000 soldiers, is poised to attack positions of militant Kurdish separatist fighters in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq. Their cross-border forays into Turkey over the last five weeks have killed dozens of Turks, both soldiers and civilians. Iraqi Kurds tacitly support their fellow Kurds, and Americans have done nothing to dissuade either group. Erdogan is under enormous pressure to respond to such attacks, but Rice highlighted "the need to look for an effective strategy, not just one that's going to strike out, somehow, and not deal with the problem."
As viewed from Turkey, American responses throughout this crisis range from duplicity to double standards. The cautionary message that Rice conveyed to her Foreign Ministry counterparts here, and that Bush is expected to echo, defines the exact opposite of policies pursued to this day by the Bush administration itself. The conditions that created the terrible prospect facing Turkey - an immediate war with rebel Kurds based in Iraq - have been wholly manufactured in Washington, which displays an unending capacity to "make the situation worse." Turkey, a staunch U.S. ally, urged restraint four-and-a-half years ago when Bush rolled his dice in Iraq. But when the gamble was lost, it was nations in the Middle East - not America - that paid. Turkey's turn to pony up has come.
The mood here is somber because when war begins, it will be real. Turks understand that the United States, thousands of miles away, is only virtually at war. U.S. soldiers are killing and being killed, to be sure. Yet the main result of their presence as an occupation force has been to ignite and sustain a set of civil wars - now including Turkey's - that have nothing to do with America. Indeed, despite the neocon rhetoric of "fight them there instead of here," the U.S. occupation of Iraq defends against no direct threat to America. As Saddam's weapons of mass destruction were a paranoid myth, so is the much-hyped dread of "Islamofascism," a phenomenon that, if it did exist, would threaten Islamic peoples and values far more than anything in the West. The problem, of course, is that militant Islamic extremists, however defined, are empowered by the U.S. occupation, not disarmed. Iraq has become a West Point for suicide bombers. Even then, the threat remains local. And although all the belligerents target the American occupiers, and will do so as long as the occupation continues, America has no authentic enemy among Iraq's sectarian belligerents. Turkey does.
In the United States, meanwhile, confusion reigns. After effectively voting against the Iraq occupation last November; after denouncing it in successive polls; after seeing the Bush administration reject its own review panel's call for a shift to diplomacy; after the touted "surge" led to more of the same; after the shock of current oil prices made the real Bush agenda in Iraq plainer ever; and after Dick Cheney and George W. Bush made the mad prospect of attack on Iran seem possible - the American public has sunk into a dispirited, and perhaps guilt-induced, detachment from the entire mess. (Again last week, Congressional Democrats, debating appropriations, dared look the Pentagon in the eye - and promptly blinked.) No such detachment is possible here in Turkey.
Before Bush's war changed everything in this region, Turkish hopes were high. An expansive European Union beckoned. Turks were poised to play a historic role as the bridge between Islam and the West. But then they found that, in the "us-against-them" war on terror, no such bridge was wanted. Europe got nervous about Turks already in its cities, and lately European countries have taken actions Turkey regards as friendly to the Kurdish rebels it is fighting. Now come warnings that, if Turkey responds to its made-in-Washington terror threat exactly as Washington does - "to strike out, somehow" - then Turkey can kiss EU admission goodbye.
The question is sharper in the United States: How much higher can the rubble pile of Bush's wreckage mount before Americans emerge from the stupor of shame to stop him?
James Carroll's column appears regularly in The Boston Globe.
No magic bullet against the PKK in Washington
05 Nov, 2007 - Omer Taspinar
No magic bullet against the PKK in Washington
What can be achieved by today's meeting between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Bush? The short answer is not much. There is a dangerous and irrational expectation in Turkey that if Washington suddenly decided to attack the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, the problem in Turkey would be magically solved. One can only wish things were so simple. In fact, the PKK is probably hoping that the US will take military action in northern Iraq. After all, being targeted and attacked by America will enhance the international legitimacy of this terrorist organization and elevate its status in the eyes of the anti-American world public opinion. How quickly we forget that there is always a "David versus Goliath" phenomenon when the weak encounter the mighty.
Over the last few weeks, the nationalist frenzy in Turkey has convinced itself that the PKK is an American and northern Iraq problem. Even well-intentioned liberal analysts started to revisit the thesis that Turkey would not be facing a PKK problem today if its parliament had decided to cooperate with Washington on March 1, 2003. Such views are naïve and wrong. It truly requires a strong degree of imagination to believe that the PKK is a product of America's invasion of Iraq or Iraqi Kurds decision to hurt Turkey. Instead of constantly blaming nefarious external forces, Turkish analysts and policy makers should learn to pay attention to domestic dynamics. It would also help to understand how nationalism, socio-economic problems and unfulfilled political expectations can become a toxic cocktail that fuels radicalism.
The PKK doesn't owe its existence, origins and power to external forces. It has been in action since 1978 and was at its most lethal and destructive in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the PKK became the symbol of Kurdish dissent and nationalism in Turkey. Yes, it was and still is a terrorist organization. The PKK used terrorism as a tactic to attack innocent civilians. But as the Turkish military unleashed its forces against it, the PKK also became -- at least in the eyes of a strong majority of the world -- a rebel movement fighting one of the most powerful militaries in the region. What Turkey failed to understand then, and still fails to understand today, is that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. Terrorists thrive when a larger and stronger force attacks them. This is especially true for guerilla terrorism. What terrorists are after is legitimacy and recognition. Once they gain regional sympathy and support, international legitimacy usually follows. Next thing you know the international media refers to them as "militants," "rebels," "insurgents" and finally as "freedom fighters."
It is also high time to debunk the myth that Turkey would have gained much leverage had it decided to cooperate with Washington in March 2003. We keep hearing this urban legend. In fact, you only need to look at Britain's Tony Blair, the most loyal of Bush supporters, to see a example of what would have happened to Turkey if Ankara had decided to play ball with the Bush administration. Blair received no rewards for his endless support for the American war effort in Iraq. He wanted a seat at the table after the war, but he soon discovered that the unilateralist Bush administration doesn't believe in tables. In 2003, Blair's only demand from President Bush was an international peace conference on the Middle East focusing on Arab-Israeli peace. Bush decided to wait until Blair was gone to consider the idea. To add insult to injury, Tony Blair ended up becoming the top envoy for the quartet dealing with Arab-Israeli peace, after he resigned as prime minister. History will not only remember him as the architect of "New Labor" but also as "the poodle of the United States." -- so much for sitting at the table with Washington.
It's really an irony of historic proportion that such a belligerent and unilateralist American president whose doctrine argues that: pre-emption works; that America is winning the "war on terror" because it is fighting terrorists "over there" rather than "over here"; and that "states harboring terrorist are no different than terrorists" would advise caution, rationalism and multilateralism when it comes to others. I hope Erdoğan can respond with a sense of humor by saying that all he wants is to apply the "Bush Doctrine" to the PKK. Yet, he should also know that the Bush doctrine will not solve PKK terrorism. The problem is not "over there" in northern Iraq.
No magic bullet against the PKK in Washington
What can be achieved by today's meeting between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Bush? The short answer is not much. There is a dangerous and irrational expectation in Turkey that if Washington suddenly decided to attack the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, the problem in Turkey would be magically solved. One can only wish things were so simple. In fact, the PKK is probably hoping that the US will take military action in northern Iraq. After all, being targeted and attacked by America will enhance the international legitimacy of this terrorist organization and elevate its status in the eyes of the anti-American world public opinion. How quickly we forget that there is always a "David versus Goliath" phenomenon when the weak encounter the mighty.
Over the last few weeks, the nationalist frenzy in Turkey has convinced itself that the PKK is an American and northern Iraq problem. Even well-intentioned liberal analysts started to revisit the thesis that Turkey would not be facing a PKK problem today if its parliament had decided to cooperate with Washington on March 1, 2003. Such views are naïve and wrong. It truly requires a strong degree of imagination to believe that the PKK is a product of America's invasion of Iraq or Iraqi Kurds decision to hurt Turkey. Instead of constantly blaming nefarious external forces, Turkish analysts and policy makers should learn to pay attention to domestic dynamics. It would also help to understand how nationalism, socio-economic problems and unfulfilled political expectations can become a toxic cocktail that fuels radicalism.
The PKK doesn't owe its existence, origins and power to external forces. It has been in action since 1978 and was at its most lethal and destructive in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the PKK became the symbol of Kurdish dissent and nationalism in Turkey. Yes, it was and still is a terrorist organization. The PKK used terrorism as a tactic to attack innocent civilians. But as the Turkish military unleashed its forces against it, the PKK also became -- at least in the eyes of a strong majority of the world -- a rebel movement fighting one of the most powerful militaries in the region. What Turkey failed to understand then, and still fails to understand today, is that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. Terrorists thrive when a larger and stronger force attacks them. This is especially true for guerilla terrorism. What terrorists are after is legitimacy and recognition. Once they gain regional sympathy and support, international legitimacy usually follows. Next thing you know the international media refers to them as "militants," "rebels," "insurgents" and finally as "freedom fighters."
It is also high time to debunk the myth that Turkey would have gained much leverage had it decided to cooperate with Washington in March 2003. We keep hearing this urban legend. In fact, you only need to look at Britain's Tony Blair, the most loyal of Bush supporters, to see a example of what would have happened to Turkey if Ankara had decided to play ball with the Bush administration. Blair received no rewards for his endless support for the American war effort in Iraq. He wanted a seat at the table after the war, but he soon discovered that the unilateralist Bush administration doesn't believe in tables. In 2003, Blair's only demand from President Bush was an international peace conference on the Middle East focusing on Arab-Israeli peace. Bush decided to wait until Blair was gone to consider the idea. To add insult to injury, Tony Blair ended up becoming the top envoy for the quartet dealing with Arab-Israeli peace, after he resigned as prime minister. History will not only remember him as the architect of "New Labor" but also as "the poodle of the United States." -- so much for sitting at the table with Washington.
It's really an irony of historic proportion that such a belligerent and unilateralist American president whose doctrine argues that: pre-emption works; that America is winning the "war on terror" because it is fighting terrorists "over there" rather than "over here"; and that "states harboring terrorist are no different than terrorists" would advise caution, rationalism and multilateralism when it comes to others. I hope Erdoğan can respond with a sense of humor by saying that all he wants is to apply the "Bush Doctrine" to the PKK. Yet, he should also know that the Bush doctrine will not solve PKK terrorism. The problem is not "over there" in northern Iraq.
Turkey's strategy against Kurds hinges on weather
MIAMI HERALD - Mon, Nov. 05, 2007
Turkey's strategy against Kurds hinges on weather
BY MATTHEW SCHOFIELD
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to decide whether to send his army south into Iraq in an effort to destroy rebel Kurdish bases there after a meeting Monday in Washington with President Bush.
But military experts say that what takes place at that meeting may not be as important to Erdogan's decision as another factor that neither Turkey nor the United States controls -- the weather.
''The winter snows are coming,'' said Sedat Laciner, director of Turkey's International Strategic Research Organization.
``The mountains are not an ideal military staging point in perfect weather. Once the winter arrives, they are impossible.''
Turkey has been threatening to send its military into northern Iraq in pursuit of guerrillas from the Kurdistan Workers' Party, known by its Kurdish initials as the PKK, who have killed 30 Turkish soldiers in the past month.
Hundredsof Turkish militia have been killed in the 25 years that the PKK has been fighting to establish an autonomous Kurdish state in southern Turkey.
But the United States, which has long included the PKK on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations, is hoping to dissuade Erdogan from launching an attack.
U.S. MEDIATES
On Sunday, U.S. officials served as the go-between in the return to Turkey of eight Turkish soldiers who had been captured Oct. 21 by PKK guerrillas.
Whether that will appease Turkish anger over PKK activities is unknown.
There was no official Turkish reaction to the release, except an acknowledgement that the soldiers were back in Turkey.
In a statement, the PKK said it expected Turkey to launch a military action soon and vowed to defend their positions in Iraq's Kandil Mountains with ``a ferocity that will teach them a lesson they will never forget.''
There will be no compromise, the statement said. ''We long for self-determination, and any solution that doesn't accomplish that -- to guarantee cultural, social and political rights -- will be refused,'' the statement said, quoting Zardesht Jody, a member of the PKK's leadership committee.
Still, military analysts said Erdogan's decision will be governed not by politics as much as by the difficulty of a winter military campaign.
Turkey has gathered tens of thousands of troops near the Iraqi border, a far larger force than the 3,000 PKK guerrillas Turkey estimates have taken refuge inside Iraq.
But the Kandil Mountains have few trails and roads. Sharply angled, and sparsely vegetated, military experts consider them impassable in the winter, especially for heavy equipment, or troop movements.
That could argue for a decision to move quickly, said Robert Ayers, an expert on terrorism at London's prestigious Chatham House research center.
HARSH TERRAIN
Ayers just returned from a visit with Turkish security officials.
''They can't move 30,000 into those mountains, only to have them trapped by the snows, both their escape route and supply routes cut off,'' Ayers said. ``If they're going in this year, and the mood seems to indicate there is the will to, there isn't much time left.''
Turkey's strategy against Kurds hinges on weather
BY MATTHEW SCHOFIELD
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to decide whether to send his army south into Iraq in an effort to destroy rebel Kurdish bases there after a meeting Monday in Washington with President Bush.
But military experts say that what takes place at that meeting may not be as important to Erdogan's decision as another factor that neither Turkey nor the United States controls -- the weather.
''The winter snows are coming,'' said Sedat Laciner, director of Turkey's International Strategic Research Organization.
``The mountains are not an ideal military staging point in perfect weather. Once the winter arrives, they are impossible.''
Turkey has been threatening to send its military into northern Iraq in pursuit of guerrillas from the Kurdistan Workers' Party, known by its Kurdish initials as the PKK, who have killed 30 Turkish soldiers in the past month.
Hundredsof Turkish militia have been killed in the 25 years that the PKK has been fighting to establish an autonomous Kurdish state in southern Turkey.
But the United States, which has long included the PKK on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations, is hoping to dissuade Erdogan from launching an attack.
U.S. MEDIATES
On Sunday, U.S. officials served as the go-between in the return to Turkey of eight Turkish soldiers who had been captured Oct. 21 by PKK guerrillas.
Whether that will appease Turkish anger over PKK activities is unknown.
There was no official Turkish reaction to the release, except an acknowledgement that the soldiers were back in Turkey.
In a statement, the PKK said it expected Turkey to launch a military action soon and vowed to defend their positions in Iraq's Kandil Mountains with ``a ferocity that will teach them a lesson they will never forget.''
There will be no compromise, the statement said. ''We long for self-determination, and any solution that doesn't accomplish that -- to guarantee cultural, social and political rights -- will be refused,'' the statement said, quoting Zardesht Jody, a member of the PKK's leadership committee.
Still, military analysts said Erdogan's decision will be governed not by politics as much as by the difficulty of a winter military campaign.
Turkey has gathered tens of thousands of troops near the Iraqi border, a far larger force than the 3,000 PKK guerrillas Turkey estimates have taken refuge inside Iraq.
But the Kandil Mountains have few trails and roads. Sharply angled, and sparsely vegetated, military experts consider them impassable in the winter, especially for heavy equipment, or troop movements.
That could argue for a decision to move quickly, said Robert Ayers, an expert on terrorism at London's prestigious Chatham House research center.
HARSH TERRAIN
Ayers just returned from a visit with Turkish security officials.
''They can't move 30,000 into those mountains, only to have them trapped by the snows, both their escape route and supply routes cut off,'' Ayers said. ``If they're going in this year, and the mood seems to indicate there is the will to, there isn't much time left.''
Erdogan Rules over Turkey's Deepest Divide
NPR.org-November 2, 2007
Erdogan Rules over Turkey's Deepest Divide
by Corey Flintoff
· Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is known as one of the most popular politicians in Turkey. Yet he represents the country's deepest divide — the question of whether the Turkish state is to be predominantly Muslim or secular.
Erdogan rose in politics through a secession of religious parties, each of which was eventually banned by Turkey's powerful military for violating secular principles. He is currently the leader of the Justice and Development Party, which denies any religious agenda.
"He says his party is not Islamist; it's conservative democrat," says Bulent Aliriza, the director of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Opponents say he's a fundamentalist who will ultimately try to turn Turkey to sharia (Muslim religious) law."
Religious vs. Secular Rule
Aliriza says it's difficult for Americans to understand the vehemence of Turkish feelings about religion in politics versus secular rule.
Until 1922, Turkey was the center of the declining Ottoman Empire, whose ruler, the sultan, was also the caliph, the leader of the Islamic community. Modern Turkey was envisioned as the antithesis of that, a democratic secular state that would foster social equality. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the nation's founder, was an Army commander, and the powerful Turkish army has remained the champion of secularism.
Sam Brannen, another expert on the region, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says critics believe Erdogan may eventually reveal himself as someone who wants to do away with Ataturk's secular vision. Brannen adds, though, that the prime minister has now "become so much a part of the secular institution that a religious agenda would undermine his own power."
Aliriza says Erdogan is a practical man, and there's one symbol that expresses where Erdogan has evolved in his thinking about religion and the state: it's the headscarf worn by devout Muslim women.
Challenges on the Road
As part of the effort to keep Turkey secular, the headscarf is banned in Turkish universities and it's frowned upon at state functions. Erdogan's wife, Emine, wears a headscarf, as do his two daughters who attended universities in the United States.
Aliriza says that, technically, Erdogan has the authority and the votes in parliament to change the law and allow headscarves in Turkish universities, but that would place him in direct confrontation with the military.
"Why hasn't he done it? You have to say that the man has adjusted to certain realities, and he refrains from doing things that he otherwise would have done," Aliriza says.
Despite Erdogan's practicality, though, Brannen says the prime minister is in a precarious position. He has staked a lot on bringing Turkey into the European Union, only to see France and Britain elect leaders who are not friendly to Turkey's bid for membership.
Erdogan is also facing a showdown with the PKK, the Kurdish guerrilla group that has been staging attacks on Turkish forces in southeastern Turkey from bases in northern Iraq. He'll need to work closely with the military to keep its commanders from going too far.
Many of Erdogan's supporters think he is tough enough and popular enough to hold his own.
The Early Days
Erdogan spent his childhood in a port town on the Black Sea, and his teenage years working his way through school by selling bread on the street in a tough neighborhood of Istanbul. He played semi-professional soccer for a club in the neighborhood for 16 years.
He was a transport worker in Istanbul and held other city jobs as he worked his way up in local politics. Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, and developed a reputation as an effective administrator, credited with building up the city's infrastructure and beautifying it, as well.
In 1998, he was convicted for reciting a poem that allegedly "incited religious hatred." Brannon says it was actually not an Islamist but a nationalist poem, but it stressed both faith and homeland. Erdogan served four months of a 10-month sentence.
That conviction proved to be a problem in 2002, when Erdogan's Justice and Development Party won a majority in the National Assembly. The conviction meant Erdogan was prohibited from running for parliament, and the constitution had to be changed to allow him to win a seat and take his place as prime minister.
Relationship with the United States
Brannen says Erdogan has more than just the Kurdish guerrilla issue to bring up with the U.S. government. He says Turkey wants more recognition for its contributions to the NATO peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. It also wants to know what Turkey would get in return if it complies with U.S. requests to cut ties with Iran and cut short contracts with Russia.
"The U.S. has promised Turkey a lot in the past," Brannen says, "but delivered very little. The trust is broken."
If talks don't work out between President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan, Brannen says there's another option.
"The Turks may just decide to wait out this administration," Brannen says.
Erdogan Rules over Turkey's Deepest Divide
by Corey Flintoff
· Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is known as one of the most popular politicians in Turkey. Yet he represents the country's deepest divide — the question of whether the Turkish state is to be predominantly Muslim or secular.
Erdogan rose in politics through a secession of religious parties, each of which was eventually banned by Turkey's powerful military for violating secular principles. He is currently the leader of the Justice and Development Party, which denies any religious agenda.
"He says his party is not Islamist; it's conservative democrat," says Bulent Aliriza, the director of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Opponents say he's a fundamentalist who will ultimately try to turn Turkey to sharia (Muslim religious) law."
Religious vs. Secular Rule
Aliriza says it's difficult for Americans to understand the vehemence of Turkish feelings about religion in politics versus secular rule.
Until 1922, Turkey was the center of the declining Ottoman Empire, whose ruler, the sultan, was also the caliph, the leader of the Islamic community. Modern Turkey was envisioned as the antithesis of that, a democratic secular state that would foster social equality. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the nation's founder, was an Army commander, and the powerful Turkish army has remained the champion of secularism.
Sam Brannen, another expert on the region, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says critics believe Erdogan may eventually reveal himself as someone who wants to do away with Ataturk's secular vision. Brannen adds, though, that the prime minister has now "become so much a part of the secular institution that a religious agenda would undermine his own power."
Aliriza says Erdogan is a practical man, and there's one symbol that expresses where Erdogan has evolved in his thinking about religion and the state: it's the headscarf worn by devout Muslim women.
Challenges on the Road
As part of the effort to keep Turkey secular, the headscarf is banned in Turkish universities and it's frowned upon at state functions. Erdogan's wife, Emine, wears a headscarf, as do his two daughters who attended universities in the United States.
Aliriza says that, technically, Erdogan has the authority and the votes in parliament to change the law and allow headscarves in Turkish universities, but that would place him in direct confrontation with the military.
"Why hasn't he done it? You have to say that the man has adjusted to certain realities, and he refrains from doing things that he otherwise would have done," Aliriza says.
Despite Erdogan's practicality, though, Brannen says the prime minister is in a precarious position. He has staked a lot on bringing Turkey into the European Union, only to see France and Britain elect leaders who are not friendly to Turkey's bid for membership.
Erdogan is also facing a showdown with the PKK, the Kurdish guerrilla group that has been staging attacks on Turkish forces in southeastern Turkey from bases in northern Iraq. He'll need to work closely with the military to keep its commanders from going too far.
Many of Erdogan's supporters think he is tough enough and popular enough to hold his own.
The Early Days
Erdogan spent his childhood in a port town on the Black Sea, and his teenage years working his way through school by selling bread on the street in a tough neighborhood of Istanbul. He played semi-professional soccer for a club in the neighborhood for 16 years.
He was a transport worker in Istanbul and held other city jobs as he worked his way up in local politics. Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, and developed a reputation as an effective administrator, credited with building up the city's infrastructure and beautifying it, as well.
In 1998, he was convicted for reciting a poem that allegedly "incited religious hatred." Brannon says it was actually not an Islamist but a nationalist poem, but it stressed both faith and homeland. Erdogan served four months of a 10-month sentence.
That conviction proved to be a problem in 2002, when Erdogan's Justice and Development Party won a majority in the National Assembly. The conviction meant Erdogan was prohibited from running for parliament, and the constitution had to be changed to allow him to win a seat and take his place as prime minister.
Relationship with the United States
Brannen says Erdogan has more than just the Kurdish guerrilla issue to bring up with the U.S. government. He says Turkey wants more recognition for its contributions to the NATO peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. It also wants to know what Turkey would get in return if it complies with U.S. requests to cut ties with Iran and cut short contracts with Russia.
"The U.S. has promised Turkey a lot in the past," Brannen says, "but delivered very little. The trust is broken."
If talks don't work out between President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan, Brannen says there's another option.
"The Turks may just decide to wait out this administration," Brannen says.
Erdogan Talks Turkey in Washington
TIME - Sunday, Nov. 04, 2007
Erdogan Talks Turkey in Washington
By Andrew Purvis
The visit by Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the White House on November 5 marks an important test of the relationship between America and its best ally in the Muslim world. In Erdogan, the U.S. has a friend who is that rarest of rarities: a democratically elected, democratically minded, economically liberal Islamist — an important bridge between the Muslim world and the secular West. The U.S. needs Erdogan as much as Erdogan needs Washington's cooperation in a recent slew of crises.
A lot is at stake. In the short term, Turkey wants a firm commitment from Washington to help rein in a Kurdish guerrilla group that has stepped up attacks on Turkish security forces, apparently from bases in Iraq, leaving more than 40 dead in October alone. Turkey believes the group, known as the PKK, or Kurdistan Worker's Party, represents as serious a threat to Turkey's existence as Washington says al-Qaeda does to America's. The group has bases in northern Iraq, and Turkey has been urging the U.S. in vain to help clean out those bases since U.S. troops arrived in 2003. In Washington, Erdogan will be seeking U.S. commitments, including military options, to address the PKK threat.
He also wants Washington to use its influence with Iraqi Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, who nominally control the region from which the PKK is operating, to crack down on the guerrillas. A failure to do so could lead Turkey to send its own troops across the border in pursuit of the PKK, an outcome that the U.S. wants to avoid not only because Iraq is ostensibly America's ally as well but because the Iraqi Kurds are that war-torn nation's only economic success story. Any large-scale movement of Turkish troops into Iraq raises the chances of a clash not just with the PKK but with Iraqi Kurdish soldiers.
For its part, Washington wants to avoid being compelled to intervene between two friends. And, on Sunday, a U.S. diplomatic push led to the release of eight Turkish soldiers held captive by the PKK in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdish leaders said they had played a role in the release.
That kind of action is crucial because Washington wants to be sure of Turkey's ongoing assistance as a staging point for oil and military supplies headed to Iraq. Turkey is also one of the few countries that can mediate between Washington and countries such as Iran and Syria. With war drums beating, Ankara may be a necessary mediator between Washington and Tehran.
In practical terms, Turkey is expected to seek either joint air strikes against PKK bases in the Qandil mountains, near the Iranian border, or American permission for Turkish planes to carry out strikes on their own. The Turkish public has been clamoring for action against the PKK in recent days. On Monday, celebrations of the 84th anniversary of modern Turkey's founding turned into massive nationwide demonstrations against the Kurdish group. The red and white Turkish flag hung across streets and from balconies; cars sported flags on their trunks. This militancy has put Erdogan and his political allies in a difficult spot. His Islamist roots have earned him the distrust of the Turkish military, the old power brokers in the country and the fortress of the nation's secular traditions. America's alliance was as much with the Turkish military as it was with the civilian government, perhaps more so. Indeed, Erdogan's government strongly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and did not allow Coalition forces to operate out of Turkish bases for the invasion.
Now, however, the U.S. needs to help Erdogan's government by enunciating policies that assuage Turkey's nationalist military and the voice it has found in the popular street demonstrations. Thus, in recent days, the U.S. has sounded more accommodating of Turkey's military proposals after earlier criticizing plans to send troops into northern Iraq. This week, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said that while Washington still opposes Turkish military operations inside the country "because obviously there are troubles enough in Iraq" Washington understands Turkey's concerns. "It is absolutely imperative that steps be taken to prevent such PKK attacks in the future," he said.
Furthermore, on Nov. 2, after speaking with Erdogan and her counterpart Ali Babacan in Ankara, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the U.S. and Turkey are now determined to work together against the "common enemy." "I affirmed to the Prime Minister as well as to the foreign minister that the United States considers the PKK a terrorist organization and indeed that we have a common enemy, that we must find ways to take effective action so that Turkey will not suffer from terrorist attacks," she told reporters after the meetings. "Such attacks are destabilizing for Iraq [and] a problem therefore of security for the United States and Turkey."
Turkey for its part has stressed that any incursion would seek only to attack the PKK and that Turkey had no designs on Iraqi territory, as some Iraqi Kurdish leaders have claimed. Foreign Minister Babacan said that if Turkey does dispatch troops "it would not be an invasion" but instead would consist more of commando raids on PKK positions.
Still, Turkey's PKK troubles are part of a larger set of problems with Kurds in the region. Turkey has accused the Iraqi Kurdish administration in northern Iraq of failing to do enough to clamp down on the PKK. This week, Turkey raised the possibility of economic sanctions against northern Iraq, including restrictions on the flow of traffic and goods at a key border crossing from Turkey into Iraq, as well as cutting off electricity that Turkey supplies to the region. Turkey's biggest fear is that Iraqi Kurds are intent on establishing a separate Kurdish state on their border, which might encourage Turkey's Kurdish minority to attempt to secede. That concern is growing ahead of a planned referendum in Iraq on control over the oil rich region of Kirkuk, a region that Iraqi Kurds claim as their own and control over which would sharply increase their economic and political clout.
In this contest, Turkey needs U.S. support to weigh in with Iraqi Kurds. Ridding the region of the PKK may sound like a difficult task, but starting a dialogue between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders that would lead to peaceful cohabitation in the region will prove more difficult still. With reporting by Pelin Turgut/Istanbul
Erdogan Talks Turkey in Washington
By Andrew Purvis
The visit by Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the White House on November 5 marks an important test of the relationship between America and its best ally in the Muslim world. In Erdogan, the U.S. has a friend who is that rarest of rarities: a democratically elected, democratically minded, economically liberal Islamist — an important bridge between the Muslim world and the secular West. The U.S. needs Erdogan as much as Erdogan needs Washington's cooperation in a recent slew of crises.
A lot is at stake. In the short term, Turkey wants a firm commitment from Washington to help rein in a Kurdish guerrilla group that has stepped up attacks on Turkish security forces, apparently from bases in Iraq, leaving more than 40 dead in October alone. Turkey believes the group, known as the PKK, or Kurdistan Worker's Party, represents as serious a threat to Turkey's existence as Washington says al-Qaeda does to America's. The group has bases in northern Iraq, and Turkey has been urging the U.S. in vain to help clean out those bases since U.S. troops arrived in 2003. In Washington, Erdogan will be seeking U.S. commitments, including military options, to address the PKK threat.
He also wants Washington to use its influence with Iraqi Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, who nominally control the region from which the PKK is operating, to crack down on the guerrillas. A failure to do so could lead Turkey to send its own troops across the border in pursuit of the PKK, an outcome that the U.S. wants to avoid not only because Iraq is ostensibly America's ally as well but because the Iraqi Kurds are that war-torn nation's only economic success story. Any large-scale movement of Turkish troops into Iraq raises the chances of a clash not just with the PKK but with Iraqi Kurdish soldiers.
For its part, Washington wants to avoid being compelled to intervene between two friends. And, on Sunday, a U.S. diplomatic push led to the release of eight Turkish soldiers held captive by the PKK in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdish leaders said they had played a role in the release.
That kind of action is crucial because Washington wants to be sure of Turkey's ongoing assistance as a staging point for oil and military supplies headed to Iraq. Turkey is also one of the few countries that can mediate between Washington and countries such as Iran and Syria. With war drums beating, Ankara may be a necessary mediator between Washington and Tehran.
In practical terms, Turkey is expected to seek either joint air strikes against PKK bases in the Qandil mountains, near the Iranian border, or American permission for Turkish planes to carry out strikes on their own. The Turkish public has been clamoring for action against the PKK in recent days. On Monday, celebrations of the 84th anniversary of modern Turkey's founding turned into massive nationwide demonstrations against the Kurdish group. The red and white Turkish flag hung across streets and from balconies; cars sported flags on their trunks. This militancy has put Erdogan and his political allies in a difficult spot. His Islamist roots have earned him the distrust of the Turkish military, the old power brokers in the country and the fortress of the nation's secular traditions. America's alliance was as much with the Turkish military as it was with the civilian government, perhaps more so. Indeed, Erdogan's government strongly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and did not allow Coalition forces to operate out of Turkish bases for the invasion.
Now, however, the U.S. needs to help Erdogan's government by enunciating policies that assuage Turkey's nationalist military and the voice it has found in the popular street demonstrations. Thus, in recent days, the U.S. has sounded more accommodating of Turkey's military proposals after earlier criticizing plans to send troops into northern Iraq. This week, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said that while Washington still opposes Turkish military operations inside the country "because obviously there are troubles enough in Iraq" Washington understands Turkey's concerns. "It is absolutely imperative that steps be taken to prevent such PKK attacks in the future," he said.
Furthermore, on Nov. 2, after speaking with Erdogan and her counterpart Ali Babacan in Ankara, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the U.S. and Turkey are now determined to work together against the "common enemy." "I affirmed to the Prime Minister as well as to the foreign minister that the United States considers the PKK a terrorist organization and indeed that we have a common enemy, that we must find ways to take effective action so that Turkey will not suffer from terrorist attacks," she told reporters after the meetings. "Such attacks are destabilizing for Iraq [and] a problem therefore of security for the United States and Turkey."
Turkey for its part has stressed that any incursion would seek only to attack the PKK and that Turkey had no designs on Iraqi territory, as some Iraqi Kurdish leaders have claimed. Foreign Minister Babacan said that if Turkey does dispatch troops "it would not be an invasion" but instead would consist more of commando raids on PKK positions.
Still, Turkey's PKK troubles are part of a larger set of problems with Kurds in the region. Turkey has accused the Iraqi Kurdish administration in northern Iraq of failing to do enough to clamp down on the PKK. This week, Turkey raised the possibility of economic sanctions against northern Iraq, including restrictions on the flow of traffic and goods at a key border crossing from Turkey into Iraq, as well as cutting off electricity that Turkey supplies to the region. Turkey's biggest fear is that Iraqi Kurds are intent on establishing a separate Kurdish state on their border, which might encourage Turkey's Kurdish minority to attempt to secede. That concern is growing ahead of a planned referendum in Iraq on control over the oil rich region of Kirkuk, a region that Iraqi Kurds claim as their own and control over which would sharply increase their economic and political clout.
In this contest, Turkey needs U.S. support to weigh in with Iraqi Kurds. Ridding the region of the PKK may sound like a difficult task, but starting a dialogue between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders that would lead to peaceful cohabitation in the region will prove more difficult still. With reporting by Pelin Turgut/Istanbul
For U.S. and Turkey, different priorities
November 5, 2007 - The Christian Science Monitor
For U.S. and Turkey, different priorities
In Washington Monday, the Turkish prime minister will focus on Kurdish rebels. The US will try to repair relations.
By Howard LaFranchi | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
On the surface, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Washington Monday is about Kurdish separatists across Turkey's border in northern Iraq, and whether the United States can pull Turkey back from launching an incursion against the rebels.
There will be lots of talk about the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, long involved in a bloody war with the Turkish government. Both the US and Turkey consider the group a terrorist organization.
But on another level, Mr. Erdogan's meeting at the White House with President Bush is about repairing relations with a crucial ally estranged by the war in Iraq. It will also test whether the US can keep a lid on the war-related flash points roiling the Middle East.
"It's high noon for the strategic relationship between the US and Turkey," says John Hulsman, a distinguished scholar in residence at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. "The PKK is the impetus, but the real issue is addressing relations that for the Bush administration have been going awry since the Iraq war."
Another "real issue" is Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, and what the Turkish military especially fears that means for Turkey, others say.
"If this were really only about the PKK, the Iraqi Kurds' offers to provide the Turks [with] information on the PKK would at least be accepted as a starting point," says Elizabeth Prodromou, a political expert on Turkey at Boston University, who is also a consultant to the State Department. "But it's not accepted because the military sees this in the context of Kurdish autonomy."
On Sunday, Kurdish rebels released eight Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq who had been captured two weeks earlier. The move could ease public pressure on Turkey's government to launch a cross-border invasion, but still, Turkey was unlikely to soften demands for tough action against the PKK.
Turkish officials have said that any decision about a cross-border incursion would await Erdogan's Washington visit.
White House officials are hoping that Turkey is in a mood to concentrate on its broad interests in a strong relationship with the US, rather than focusing narrowly or exclusively on the PKK. In addition to addressing efforts to counter the PKK, Erdogan and Mr. Bush will discuss "the promotion of peace and stability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader Middle East," as well as US support for Turkey's bid to join the European Union, the White House says.
But from the Turkish perspective, the PKK is the issue – and the goal of the trip is convincing the US that an offensive against the militants is justified, according to analysts. "Erdogan is coming with many files in his suitcase, but they are all on the PKK," says Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Erdogan will come with data on PKK attacks on Turkish sites and the military, on the dozens of Turks killed in PKK attacks in just this past month, and on PKK camps and strength in northern Iraq, Mr. Cagaptay says.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Turkish officials this past weekend in Turkey. Although the US has called for Turkish restraint in dealing with the PKK, Secretary Rice assured the officials that the US would help in the fight against the rebels.
"We consider this a common threat, not just to the interests of Turkey, but to the interests of the United States as well," she said Friday at a joint news conference with the Turkish foreign minister. "This is going to take persistence, and it's going to take commitment. This is a very difficult problem."
The US rates low marks from Turkish politicians and the Turkish public over what they see as an American failure to control the territory in next-door Iraq, where PKK militants appear to roam free.
They also believe the US has failed to get tough with the Iraqi Kurds, whom they fault for not going after the militants.
"The Turkish view is that Iraq is a crisis of our making that has made their life more difficult, says Mr. Hulsman.
At an international conference on Iraq Saturday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pledged to work with neighboring countries to address threats such as the PKK.
For U.S. and Turkey, different priorities
In Washington Monday, the Turkish prime minister will focus on Kurdish rebels. The US will try to repair relations.
By Howard LaFranchi | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
On the surface, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Washington Monday is about Kurdish separatists across Turkey's border in northern Iraq, and whether the United States can pull Turkey back from launching an incursion against the rebels.
There will be lots of talk about the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, long involved in a bloody war with the Turkish government. Both the US and Turkey consider the group a terrorist organization.
But on another level, Mr. Erdogan's meeting at the White House with President Bush is about repairing relations with a crucial ally estranged by the war in Iraq. It will also test whether the US can keep a lid on the war-related flash points roiling the Middle East.
"It's high noon for the strategic relationship between the US and Turkey," says John Hulsman, a distinguished scholar in residence at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. "The PKK is the impetus, but the real issue is addressing relations that for the Bush administration have been going awry since the Iraq war."
Another "real issue" is Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, and what the Turkish military especially fears that means for Turkey, others say.
"If this were really only about the PKK, the Iraqi Kurds' offers to provide the Turks [with] information on the PKK would at least be accepted as a starting point," says Elizabeth Prodromou, a political expert on Turkey at Boston University, who is also a consultant to the State Department. "But it's not accepted because the military sees this in the context of Kurdish autonomy."
On Sunday, Kurdish rebels released eight Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq who had been captured two weeks earlier. The move could ease public pressure on Turkey's government to launch a cross-border invasion, but still, Turkey was unlikely to soften demands for tough action against the PKK.
Turkish officials have said that any decision about a cross-border incursion would await Erdogan's Washington visit.
White House officials are hoping that Turkey is in a mood to concentrate on its broad interests in a strong relationship with the US, rather than focusing narrowly or exclusively on the PKK. In addition to addressing efforts to counter the PKK, Erdogan and Mr. Bush will discuss "the promotion of peace and stability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader Middle East," as well as US support for Turkey's bid to join the European Union, the White House says.
But from the Turkish perspective, the PKK is the issue – and the goal of the trip is convincing the US that an offensive against the militants is justified, according to analysts. "Erdogan is coming with many files in his suitcase, but they are all on the PKK," says Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Erdogan will come with data on PKK attacks on Turkish sites and the military, on the dozens of Turks killed in PKK attacks in just this past month, and on PKK camps and strength in northern Iraq, Mr. Cagaptay says.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Turkish officials this past weekend in Turkey. Although the US has called for Turkish restraint in dealing with the PKK, Secretary Rice assured the officials that the US would help in the fight against the rebels.
"We consider this a common threat, not just to the interests of Turkey, but to the interests of the United States as well," she said Friday at a joint news conference with the Turkish foreign minister. "This is going to take persistence, and it's going to take commitment. This is a very difficult problem."
The US rates low marks from Turkish politicians and the Turkish public over what they see as an American failure to control the territory in next-door Iraq, where PKK militants appear to roam free.
They also believe the US has failed to get tough with the Iraqi Kurds, whom they fault for not going after the militants.
"The Turkish view is that Iraq is a crisis of our making that has made their life more difficult, says Mr. Hulsman.
At an international conference on Iraq Saturday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pledged to work with neighboring countries to address threats such as the PKK.
Turkey Skeptical of Iraqi Vows to Stop Kurdish Raids
November 4, 2007 - NYT
Turkey Skeptical of Iraqi Vows to Stop Kurdish Raids
By HELENE COOPER and RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
ISTANBUL, Nov. 3 — Turkey said on Saturday that two days of meetings with officials from Iraq and the United States on how to stop Kurdish militants who attack Turkey from northern Iraq had produced no new proposals.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with the prime minister of Iraq, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, and the premier of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at a conference here, in a bid to ease tensions between Iraq and Turkey over the rebels, known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K.
Iraq pledged it would enact measures to stop the guerrillas. On Saturday afternoon, offices of a political party affiliated with the P.K.K. were shut in at least two northern Iraqi cities. But Turkish officials said the measures had been offered before.
“It has been a meeting with no resolution,” a Foreign Ministry official said after the conference. “There have been no tangible steps offered to us.”
Iraqi officials said that they were setting up checkpoints in northern Iraq and that Kurdish guerrillas would be arrested if stopped. Kurdish security forces also shut down the offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, which has links to the P.K.K., in Sulaimaniya and Erbil. The measures were meant to try to forestall a threatened Turkish retaliatory strike, which Iraqi and American diplomats fear would further inflame Iraq.
“The Iraqi government will actively help Turkey to overcome the P.K.K.,” Iraq’s foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, told reporters after his meeting here with Ms. Rice and Turkey’s foreign minister, Ali Babacan. “We are committed to undertaking a number of demonstrable and visible initiatives to disrupt, pacify and to isolate the P.K.K.”
In Sulaimaniya, 40 gun-toting members of local security forces surrounded and raided the party’s office. One security force commander said that party members were not from the city and were being ordered to leave.
But a senior party official, Dr. Abu Bakr Majid, said later that party members had been told to go home but had not been ordered out of the city, and that officers told them their computers and other equipment would not be removed.
He disputed that party members were not from the city, and said there were no arrests on Saturday in Erbil or Sulaimaniya, though he said a party leader was detained in Dohuk. Party offices in Kirkuk and Mosul were not raided, he said.
The forces in the raid seemed to be on edge, briefly detaining a reporter and photographer from The New York Times and ordering them onto the back of a truck loaded with armed men.
“We’re doing this because we’re getting pressure from Turkey,” said one of the officers, who declined to give his name.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry official, who declined to be identified according to diplomatic protocol, dismissed the raids as theater. “We consider these as secondary steps, nothing sufficient enough to actually resolve the conflict,” he said.
He said the Iraqi delegation “tried to create an air of new measures, but behind closed doors, they could not offer us anything new.”
It was not clear how effective the Iraqi raids on the party offices would be in disrupting P.K.K. activities. The guerrillas have sympathizers within the Kurdish security forces and can move from their mountain bases to the cities by pretending to be unconnected to the P.K.K. They also have provisions stored in their hide-outs.
The party’s Erbil office was closed in 2006, only to be allowed to re-open two months later.
At the Istanbul conference, Mr. Maliki told officials from the United States, Europe and the Middle East that Iraq had overcome the threat of civil war.
“The civil war that Al Qaeda wanted to spread has been prevented,” he said. “Iraq has overcome the period of anger and is stronger and more experienced today.”
The rosy picture painted by Mr. Maliki was at odds with the frustration expressed by Turkey, the host of the conference. Turkish officials hinted strongly that if Iraq and the United States did not act swiftly to rein in the guerrillas, Mr. Erdogan would decide he had no choice but to strike across the border, Arab and American diplomats said.
Mr. Erdogan has set Monday, when he is scheduled to meet with President Bush at the White House, as a de facto deadline for American and Iraqi action. The Turkish military has indicated that it is willing to wait for Mr. Erdogan’s return before launching any operation into Iraq.
“Important and immediate measures are as necessary against the terror groups in certain parts of Iraq that hurt neighboring countries as they are against the terror groups inside Iraq that cause trouble for the Iraqi administration,” Mr. Erdogan said in his opening statement. “A tiny flame can become a wildfire.”
The Kurdish issue dominated Saturday’s meeting, held at the ornate Ciragan Palace on the banks of the Bosporus. Indeed, Iraqi officials complained that the focus of the meeting, which they had hoped would be on ways the participants could help prop up the Iraqi government, had shifted to talk among Middle Eastern powers about fears that the violence in Iraq threatened to engulf the region.
Helene Cooper reported from Istanbul, and Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Sulaimaniya, Iraq. Sabrina Tavernise and Sebnem Arsu contributed reporting from Istanbul, and Michael Kamber from Sulaimaniya.
Turkey Skeptical of Iraqi Vows to Stop Kurdish Raids
By HELENE COOPER and RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
ISTANBUL, Nov. 3 — Turkey said on Saturday that two days of meetings with officials from Iraq and the United States on how to stop Kurdish militants who attack Turkey from northern Iraq had produced no new proposals.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with the prime minister of Iraq, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, and the premier of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at a conference here, in a bid to ease tensions between Iraq and Turkey over the rebels, known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K.
Iraq pledged it would enact measures to stop the guerrillas. On Saturday afternoon, offices of a political party affiliated with the P.K.K. were shut in at least two northern Iraqi cities. But Turkish officials said the measures had been offered before.
“It has been a meeting with no resolution,” a Foreign Ministry official said after the conference. “There have been no tangible steps offered to us.”
Iraqi officials said that they were setting up checkpoints in northern Iraq and that Kurdish guerrillas would be arrested if stopped. Kurdish security forces also shut down the offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, which has links to the P.K.K., in Sulaimaniya and Erbil. The measures were meant to try to forestall a threatened Turkish retaliatory strike, which Iraqi and American diplomats fear would further inflame Iraq.
“The Iraqi government will actively help Turkey to overcome the P.K.K.,” Iraq’s foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, told reporters after his meeting here with Ms. Rice and Turkey’s foreign minister, Ali Babacan. “We are committed to undertaking a number of demonstrable and visible initiatives to disrupt, pacify and to isolate the P.K.K.”
In Sulaimaniya, 40 gun-toting members of local security forces surrounded and raided the party’s office. One security force commander said that party members were not from the city and were being ordered to leave.
But a senior party official, Dr. Abu Bakr Majid, said later that party members had been told to go home but had not been ordered out of the city, and that officers told them their computers and other equipment would not be removed.
He disputed that party members were not from the city, and said there were no arrests on Saturday in Erbil or Sulaimaniya, though he said a party leader was detained in Dohuk. Party offices in Kirkuk and Mosul were not raided, he said.
The forces in the raid seemed to be on edge, briefly detaining a reporter and photographer from The New York Times and ordering them onto the back of a truck loaded with armed men.
“We’re doing this because we’re getting pressure from Turkey,” said one of the officers, who declined to give his name.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry official, who declined to be identified according to diplomatic protocol, dismissed the raids as theater. “We consider these as secondary steps, nothing sufficient enough to actually resolve the conflict,” he said.
He said the Iraqi delegation “tried to create an air of new measures, but behind closed doors, they could not offer us anything new.”
It was not clear how effective the Iraqi raids on the party offices would be in disrupting P.K.K. activities. The guerrillas have sympathizers within the Kurdish security forces and can move from their mountain bases to the cities by pretending to be unconnected to the P.K.K. They also have provisions stored in their hide-outs.
The party’s Erbil office was closed in 2006, only to be allowed to re-open two months later.
At the Istanbul conference, Mr. Maliki told officials from the United States, Europe and the Middle East that Iraq had overcome the threat of civil war.
“The civil war that Al Qaeda wanted to spread has been prevented,” he said. “Iraq has overcome the period of anger and is stronger and more experienced today.”
The rosy picture painted by Mr. Maliki was at odds with the frustration expressed by Turkey, the host of the conference. Turkish officials hinted strongly that if Iraq and the United States did not act swiftly to rein in the guerrillas, Mr. Erdogan would decide he had no choice but to strike across the border, Arab and American diplomats said.
Mr. Erdogan has set Monday, when he is scheduled to meet with President Bush at the White House, as a de facto deadline for American and Iraqi action. The Turkish military has indicated that it is willing to wait for Mr. Erdogan’s return before launching any operation into Iraq.
“Important and immediate measures are as necessary against the terror groups in certain parts of Iraq that hurt neighboring countries as they are against the terror groups inside Iraq that cause trouble for the Iraqi administration,” Mr. Erdogan said in his opening statement. “A tiny flame can become a wildfire.”
The Kurdish issue dominated Saturday’s meeting, held at the ornate Ciragan Palace on the banks of the Bosporus. Indeed, Iraqi officials complained that the focus of the meeting, which they had hoped would be on ways the participants could help prop up the Iraqi government, had shifted to talk among Middle Eastern powers about fears that the violence in Iraq threatened to engulf the region.
Helene Cooper reported from Istanbul, and Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Sulaimaniya, Iraq. Sabrina Tavernise and Sebnem Arsu contributed reporting from Istanbul, and Michael Kamber from Sulaimaniya.
Resolving the Kurdish Dilemma
November 2, 2007 - The Wall Street Journal
COMMENTARY
Resolving the Kurdish Dilemma
By EDWARD P. JOSEPH and MICHAEL E. O'HANLON
As President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prepare for next week's crucial meetings with Turkey's leaders about the attacks by Kurdish PKK rebels, they
should look beyond crisis management to deal with the wider Turkish-Kurdish agenda.If they do, it is possible that the political stalemate within Iraq can begin to be broken as well. Broadening the agenda could make diplomacy easier.
Iraq's responsible Kurdish establishment is appealing to Washington for support. Kurdish leaders like Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih see the U.S. as the indispensable player in resolving the crisis. Turkey has put aside anger over a recent Congressional resolution on the Armenian genocide; it also looks to Washington to advance its legitimate demand that the PKK threat in northern Iraq be dealt with once and for all.
The problem is that, while Washington is relevant politically, it will be tough to broker a deal that will meet Turkish expectations. The momentum in Turkey towards a decisive military confrontation is strong. So is the resistance in the Kurdish region of Iraq towards a crackdown on the PKK, which is popular among Kurds along both sides of the border.
Mr. Bush and Ms. Rice may be tempted to simply soothe tempers and focus on the PKK
problem. But all indications are that won't solve much. And a Turkish invasion, even if limited to the Qandil Mountain stronghold of the PKK, could have disastrous
consequences. It would destabilize the most successful part of Iraq and further solidify Kurdish nationalism -- rendering compromise over the flashpoint, oil-rich town of Kirkuk even more difficult.
Averting crisis in Kurdistan requires dealing with the three most neuralgic issues: the PKK, oil and Kirkuk. Turkey sees Kurdish control of Kirkuk and its oil as the precursor to a Kurdistan independent from Iraq, which could in turn lead to the violent breakaway of Turkey's Kurdish region. Iraqi Kurds see Kirkuk as an inalienable piece of Kurdish patrimony and a source of revenue-producing oil and gas. A comprehensive deal will take some time to negotiate. But a signal from Washington to finally deal with all these issues, and make tradeoffs across all three, could be the key to defusing the current crisis.
Instead of simply delaying resolution of Kirkuk, as Washington has asked the Kurds to
do so far, the U.S. should table creative options like giving the town a "special status" under the Iraqi constitution. The constitution's wide federalism provisions permit making Kirkuk its own region, while at the same time guaranteeing full power-sharing and property rights for its Turkomen, Arab and other minorities.
While not achieving maximal Kurdish aspirations to reclaim all of Kirkuk under their
control, a special status would advance much of the Kurdish agenda without crossing
Turkish red lines. It would also stimulate much-needed dialogue with Kirkuk's sizeable non-Kurdish minority, roughly 40% of the population.
As for oil, the Kurds have been a major obstacle to a comprehensive package on
production and revenue-sharing necessary for a political settlement in Iraq as a whole. In July, a breakthrough seemed close, but fell apart largely over Kurdish concerns about their autonomy to enter into contracts unfettered by Baghdad. Likewise, the question of whether Kirkuk's oil and gas is from "current fields" (subject to sharing with others in Iraq) or "new fields" (possibly exempt from the same kind of sharing) is another nettlesome question that has so far defied resolution.
Up to now, Kurdish leaders have adroitly played their role as "kingmaker" in Baghdad
helping determine which Shiite leader governs Iraq in exchange for freedom to assert
their demands on oil and Kirkuk. Now, these same Kurdish leaders, facing their most
serious crisis since the U.S. invasion in 2003, might be more willing to listen to creative, carefully crafted proposals from Washington.
An oil deal addressing Kurdish concerns about interference from Baghdad, while
providing firm guarantees about production and revenue sharing, is certainly possible.
And a breakthrough on oil could advance discussions on the other political questions.
Progress on Kirkuk might make possible a badly needed conversation in Baghdad on
political arrangements to accommodate the concerns of the capital's mixed populations
(such as helping people to relocate safely if they feel the need), while acknowledging the reality, as seen in Kirkuk, that the country's demographics have been altered by war.
Mr. Joseph is visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies. Mr. O'Hanlon directs the "Opportunity 08 Project" at the Brookings Institution.
COMMENTARY
Resolving the Kurdish Dilemma
By EDWARD P. JOSEPH and MICHAEL E. O'HANLON
As President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prepare for next week's crucial meetings with Turkey's leaders about the attacks by Kurdish PKK rebels, they
should look beyond crisis management to deal with the wider Turkish-Kurdish agenda.If they do, it is possible that the political stalemate within Iraq can begin to be broken as well. Broadening the agenda could make diplomacy easier.
Iraq's responsible Kurdish establishment is appealing to Washington for support. Kurdish leaders like Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih see the U.S. as the indispensable player in resolving the crisis. Turkey has put aside anger over a recent Congressional resolution on the Armenian genocide; it also looks to Washington to advance its legitimate demand that the PKK threat in northern Iraq be dealt with once and for all.
The problem is that, while Washington is relevant politically, it will be tough to broker a deal that will meet Turkish expectations. The momentum in Turkey towards a decisive military confrontation is strong. So is the resistance in the Kurdish region of Iraq towards a crackdown on the PKK, which is popular among Kurds along both sides of the border.
Mr. Bush and Ms. Rice may be tempted to simply soothe tempers and focus on the PKK
problem. But all indications are that won't solve much. And a Turkish invasion, even if limited to the Qandil Mountain stronghold of the PKK, could have disastrous
consequences. It would destabilize the most successful part of Iraq and further solidify Kurdish nationalism -- rendering compromise over the flashpoint, oil-rich town of Kirkuk even more difficult.
Averting crisis in Kurdistan requires dealing with the three most neuralgic issues: the PKK, oil and Kirkuk. Turkey sees Kurdish control of Kirkuk and its oil as the precursor to a Kurdistan independent from Iraq, which could in turn lead to the violent breakaway of Turkey's Kurdish region. Iraqi Kurds see Kirkuk as an inalienable piece of Kurdish patrimony and a source of revenue-producing oil and gas. A comprehensive deal will take some time to negotiate. But a signal from Washington to finally deal with all these issues, and make tradeoffs across all three, could be the key to defusing the current crisis.
Instead of simply delaying resolution of Kirkuk, as Washington has asked the Kurds to
do so far, the U.S. should table creative options like giving the town a "special status" under the Iraqi constitution. The constitution's wide federalism provisions permit making Kirkuk its own region, while at the same time guaranteeing full power-sharing and property rights for its Turkomen, Arab and other minorities.
While not achieving maximal Kurdish aspirations to reclaim all of Kirkuk under their
control, a special status would advance much of the Kurdish agenda without crossing
Turkish red lines. It would also stimulate much-needed dialogue with Kirkuk's sizeable non-Kurdish minority, roughly 40% of the population.
As for oil, the Kurds have been a major obstacle to a comprehensive package on
production and revenue-sharing necessary for a political settlement in Iraq as a whole. In July, a breakthrough seemed close, but fell apart largely over Kurdish concerns about their autonomy to enter into contracts unfettered by Baghdad. Likewise, the question of whether Kirkuk's oil and gas is from "current fields" (subject to sharing with others in Iraq) or "new fields" (possibly exempt from the same kind of sharing) is another nettlesome question that has so far defied resolution.
Up to now, Kurdish leaders have adroitly played their role as "kingmaker" in Baghdad
helping determine which Shiite leader governs Iraq in exchange for freedom to assert
their demands on oil and Kirkuk. Now, these same Kurdish leaders, facing their most
serious crisis since the U.S. invasion in 2003, might be more willing to listen to creative, carefully crafted proposals from Washington.
An oil deal addressing Kurdish concerns about interference from Baghdad, while
providing firm guarantees about production and revenue sharing, is certainly possible.
And a breakthrough on oil could advance discussions on the other political questions.
Progress on Kirkuk might make possible a badly needed conversation in Baghdad on
political arrangements to accommodate the concerns of the capital's mixed populations
(such as helping people to relocate safely if they feel the need), while acknowledging the reality, as seen in Kirkuk, that the country's demographics have been altered by war.
Mr. Joseph is visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies. Mr. O'Hanlon directs the "Opportunity 08 Project" at the Brookings Institution.
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