GUARDIAN - Wednesday November 7, 2007 11:31 AM
By CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA
ISTANBUL, Turkey (AP) - The jailed chief of Turkey's Kurdish rebels remains a powerful symbol for fighters who revere him with a personality cult. But the guerrilla lieutenants who plot tactics from bases in northern Iraq are coming under increasing scrutiny as Turkey presses Iraq and the United States for their arrest.
They include Murat Karayilan and Cemil Bayik, veteran commanders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, who may have authorized recent attacks that pushed Turkey close to ordering a cross-border offensive against rebel shelters in Iraq. Another prominent rebel is Fehman Huseyin, believed to be the top field commander of the PKK's military wing.
On Monday, President Bush met Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Washington and promised him that the United States would share military intelligence in the hunt for PKK rebels. Turkey credited U.S. help in the 1999 capture in Kenya of Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK who is now serving a life sentence on a prison island in Turkey.
Without providing names, the Pentagon also has said 10 PKK members are in a U.S. ``most-wanted'' database, meaning American forces have had standing orders for some time to pick them up if they are found. Citing Iraqi officials, Turkish media have said Turkey delivered a list of 150 alleged PKK members to Iraq and demanded their extradition.
The PKK, which launched guerrilla warfare in 1984, started out with a Marxist ideology mixed with Kurdish nationalism, but it later softened its demands and dropped the idea of an independent homeland. The rebels now say they seek more rights for Turkey's Kurdish minority, which lives primarily in the country's southeast and in immigrant communities in large cities.
The United States and Europe label the PKK as a terrorist organization. Turkey dismisses the group as a murderous gang and refuses to negotiate with it.
Ocalan drew comparisons with Stalin for his harsh control over the group, often killing or imprisoning members who deviated from his edicts. His presence still permeates the PKK, which displays his image on banners and demands his release, though factions developed as commanders debated whether to seek war or peace. Ocalan's brother, Osman, was a PKK leader who quit the group several years ago.
Other individuals accused of being PKK decision-makers are Duran Kalkan, Riza Altun and Zubeyir Aydar, a lawmaker ejected from the Turkish parliament in 1994.
The leadership council of the PKK is based at Mount Qandil, which straddles the Iraq-Iran border and is 60 miles from the frontier between Iraq and Turkey. It has links with organizers in Europe who provide funds, allegedly through illegal activities such as drug-running.
Some suspects have traveled extensively in Europe, angering Turkish authorities who say countries there should do more to restrict rebel activities among their large Kurdish populations. And in recent months, PKK commanders have spoken to foreign journalists who travel to their sanctuaries, triggering criticism of Iraqi leaders for their failure to crack down on the group.
Karayilan, a PKK leader in his 50s who wears an olive green uniform, is a key figure in the current tension over whether Turkey will attack rebels in northern Iraq despite U.S. and Iraqi calls for restraint.
On Sunday, shortly after the PKK released eight abducted Turkish soldiers, Karayilan delivered an appeal directed at the United States for a peaceful solution to what he called the ``Kurdish question.'' But because of the PKK's terrorist label, the guerrilla commander's plea was unlikely to win the international recognition he seeks.
Aliza Marcus, author of a book titled ``Blood and Belief: the PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence,'' described Karayilan as an experienced military fighter and more of an independent thinker in an organization where anyone who opposed Ocalan risked ostracism or death in an internal purge.
``He can see sort of two steps ahead,'' Marcus said. ``The other guys are more 'yes' men. They're not people who can think outside the box.''
Turkey believes Karayilan has virtually run the PKK since Ocalan, who sets the tone for the rebel group with appeals for peace and Kurdish rights, gave consent to the guerrilla leaders to determine operational details on their own because he cannot do so from his cell.
Ocalan delivered a message through his lawyers last week in which he said the PKK leadership at Mount Qandil ``should not act under orders from anyone; it should make its own decisions itself,'' the pro-Kurdish Firat news agency reported.
Bayik, another longtime leader of the PKK, attended its inaugural congress in 1978 and was named deputy secretary general. Testimony during Ocalan's 1999 trial referred to Bayik's presence in training camps in Lebanon and Syria, and to his role in transferring money to the PKK from Europe. He is also believed to have spent time in Iran.
Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd also known as ``Doctor Bahoz,'' is in charge of the People's Defense Forces, the armed wing of the PKK. Turkey's Hurriyet newspaper reported in January that Huseyin gave a speech to PKK members at that time in which he exhorted them to follow orders from commanders and repeatedly reminded them that they were at war.
Hurriyet said the speech was in Kurdish, but was translated into Turkish for broadcast over wireless radios. The Turkish military sometimes intercepts rebel communications and leaks their contents to Turkish media.
``He's one of the younger guys, he's not a member of the leadership council,'' said Ali Koknar, a Turkish security consultant based in Washington. ``He has proven himself in combat.''
Carroll: For Turkey, the war
International Herald Tribune-Tuesday, November 6, 2007
By James Carroll
ISTANBUL: Here in Turkey, Condoleezza Rice offered sage advice to Turkish leaders ahead of the Washington meeting between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan. "Effective action means action that can deal with the threat," she said Friday, but won't "make the situation worse."
The Turkish military, with a deployed force of up to 100,000 soldiers, is poised to attack positions of militant Kurdish separatist fighters in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq. Their cross-border forays into Turkey over the last five weeks have killed dozens of Turks, both soldiers and civilians. Iraqi Kurds tacitly support their fellow Kurds, and Americans have done nothing to dissuade either group. Erdogan is under enormous pressure to respond to such attacks, but Rice highlighted "the need to look for an effective strategy, not just one that's going to strike out, somehow, and not deal with the problem."
As viewed from Turkey, American responses throughout this crisis range from duplicity to double standards. The cautionary message that Rice conveyed to her Foreign Ministry counterparts here, and that Bush is expected to echo, defines the exact opposite of policies pursued to this day by the Bush administration itself. The conditions that created the terrible prospect facing Turkey - an immediate war with rebel Kurds based in Iraq - have been wholly manufactured in Washington, which displays an unending capacity to "make the situation worse." Turkey, a staunch U.S. ally, urged restraint four-and-a-half years ago when Bush rolled his dice in Iraq. But when the gamble was lost, it was nations in the Middle East - not America - that paid. Turkey's turn to pony up has come.
The mood here is somber because when war begins, it will be real. Turks understand that the United States, thousands of miles away, is only virtually at war. U.S. soldiers are killing and being killed, to be sure. Yet the main result of their presence as an occupation force has been to ignite and sustain a set of civil wars - now including Turkey's - that have nothing to do with America. Indeed, despite the neocon rhetoric of "fight them there instead of here," the U.S. occupation of Iraq defends against no direct threat to America. As Saddam's weapons of mass destruction were a paranoid myth, so is the much-hyped dread of "Islamofascism," a phenomenon that, if it did exist, would threaten Islamic peoples and values far more than anything in the West. The problem, of course, is that militant Islamic extremists, however defined, are empowered by the U.S. occupation, not disarmed. Iraq has become a West Point for suicide bombers. Even then, the threat remains local. And although all the belligerents target the American occupiers, and will do so as long as the occupation continues, America has no authentic enemy among Iraq's sectarian belligerents. Turkey does.
In the United States, meanwhile, confusion reigns. After effectively voting against the Iraq occupation last November; after denouncing it in successive polls; after seeing the Bush administration reject its own review panel's call for a shift to diplomacy; after the touted "surge" led to more of the same; after the shock of current oil prices made the real Bush agenda in Iraq plainer ever; and after Dick Cheney and George W. Bush made the mad prospect of attack on Iran seem possible - the American public has sunk into a dispirited, and perhaps guilt-induced, detachment from the entire mess. (Again last week, Congressional Democrats, debating appropriations, dared look the Pentagon in the eye - and promptly blinked.) No such detachment is possible here in Turkey.
Before Bush's war changed everything in this region, Turkish hopes were high. An expansive European Union beckoned. Turks were poised to play a historic role as the bridge between Islam and the West. But then they found that, in the "us-against-them" war on terror, no such bridge was wanted. Europe got nervous about Turks already in its cities, and lately European countries have taken actions Turkey regards as friendly to the Kurdish rebels it is fighting. Now come warnings that, if Turkey responds to its made-in-Washington terror threat exactly as Washington does - "to strike out, somehow" - then Turkey can kiss EU admission goodbye.
The question is sharper in the United States: How much higher can the rubble pile of Bush's wreckage mount before Americans emerge from the stupor of shame to stop him?
James Carroll's column appears regularly in The Boston Globe.
By James Carroll
ISTANBUL: Here in Turkey, Condoleezza Rice offered sage advice to Turkish leaders ahead of the Washington meeting between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan. "Effective action means action that can deal with the threat," she said Friday, but won't "make the situation worse."
The Turkish military, with a deployed force of up to 100,000 soldiers, is poised to attack positions of militant Kurdish separatist fighters in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq. Their cross-border forays into Turkey over the last five weeks have killed dozens of Turks, both soldiers and civilians. Iraqi Kurds tacitly support their fellow Kurds, and Americans have done nothing to dissuade either group. Erdogan is under enormous pressure to respond to such attacks, but Rice highlighted "the need to look for an effective strategy, not just one that's going to strike out, somehow, and not deal with the problem."
As viewed from Turkey, American responses throughout this crisis range from duplicity to double standards. The cautionary message that Rice conveyed to her Foreign Ministry counterparts here, and that Bush is expected to echo, defines the exact opposite of policies pursued to this day by the Bush administration itself. The conditions that created the terrible prospect facing Turkey - an immediate war with rebel Kurds based in Iraq - have been wholly manufactured in Washington, which displays an unending capacity to "make the situation worse." Turkey, a staunch U.S. ally, urged restraint four-and-a-half years ago when Bush rolled his dice in Iraq. But when the gamble was lost, it was nations in the Middle East - not America - that paid. Turkey's turn to pony up has come.
The mood here is somber because when war begins, it will be real. Turks understand that the United States, thousands of miles away, is only virtually at war. U.S. soldiers are killing and being killed, to be sure. Yet the main result of their presence as an occupation force has been to ignite and sustain a set of civil wars - now including Turkey's - that have nothing to do with America. Indeed, despite the neocon rhetoric of "fight them there instead of here," the U.S. occupation of Iraq defends against no direct threat to America. As Saddam's weapons of mass destruction were a paranoid myth, so is the much-hyped dread of "Islamofascism," a phenomenon that, if it did exist, would threaten Islamic peoples and values far more than anything in the West. The problem, of course, is that militant Islamic extremists, however defined, are empowered by the U.S. occupation, not disarmed. Iraq has become a West Point for suicide bombers. Even then, the threat remains local. And although all the belligerents target the American occupiers, and will do so as long as the occupation continues, America has no authentic enemy among Iraq's sectarian belligerents. Turkey does.
In the United States, meanwhile, confusion reigns. After effectively voting against the Iraq occupation last November; after denouncing it in successive polls; after seeing the Bush administration reject its own review panel's call for a shift to diplomacy; after the touted "surge" led to more of the same; after the shock of current oil prices made the real Bush agenda in Iraq plainer ever; and after Dick Cheney and George W. Bush made the mad prospect of attack on Iran seem possible - the American public has sunk into a dispirited, and perhaps guilt-induced, detachment from the entire mess. (Again last week, Congressional Democrats, debating appropriations, dared look the Pentagon in the eye - and promptly blinked.) No such detachment is possible here in Turkey.
Before Bush's war changed everything in this region, Turkish hopes were high. An expansive European Union beckoned. Turks were poised to play a historic role as the bridge between Islam and the West. But then they found that, in the "us-against-them" war on terror, no such bridge was wanted. Europe got nervous about Turks already in its cities, and lately European countries have taken actions Turkey regards as friendly to the Kurdish rebels it is fighting. Now come warnings that, if Turkey responds to its made-in-Washington terror threat exactly as Washington does - "to strike out, somehow" - then Turkey can kiss EU admission goodbye.
The question is sharper in the United States: How much higher can the rubble pile of Bush's wreckage mount before Americans emerge from the stupor of shame to stop him?
James Carroll's column appears regularly in The Boston Globe.
No magic bullet against the PKK in Washington
05 Nov, 2007 - Omer Taspinar
No magic bullet against the PKK in Washington
What can be achieved by today's meeting between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Bush? The short answer is not much. There is a dangerous and irrational expectation in Turkey that if Washington suddenly decided to attack the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, the problem in Turkey would be magically solved. One can only wish things were so simple. In fact, the PKK is probably hoping that the US will take military action in northern Iraq. After all, being targeted and attacked by America will enhance the international legitimacy of this terrorist organization and elevate its status in the eyes of the anti-American world public opinion. How quickly we forget that there is always a "David versus Goliath" phenomenon when the weak encounter the mighty.
Over the last few weeks, the nationalist frenzy in Turkey has convinced itself that the PKK is an American and northern Iraq problem. Even well-intentioned liberal analysts started to revisit the thesis that Turkey would not be facing a PKK problem today if its parliament had decided to cooperate with Washington on March 1, 2003. Such views are naïve and wrong. It truly requires a strong degree of imagination to believe that the PKK is a product of America's invasion of Iraq or Iraqi Kurds decision to hurt Turkey. Instead of constantly blaming nefarious external forces, Turkish analysts and policy makers should learn to pay attention to domestic dynamics. It would also help to understand how nationalism, socio-economic problems and unfulfilled political expectations can become a toxic cocktail that fuels radicalism.
The PKK doesn't owe its existence, origins and power to external forces. It has been in action since 1978 and was at its most lethal and destructive in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the PKK became the symbol of Kurdish dissent and nationalism in Turkey. Yes, it was and still is a terrorist organization. The PKK used terrorism as a tactic to attack innocent civilians. But as the Turkish military unleashed its forces against it, the PKK also became -- at least in the eyes of a strong majority of the world -- a rebel movement fighting one of the most powerful militaries in the region. What Turkey failed to understand then, and still fails to understand today, is that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. Terrorists thrive when a larger and stronger force attacks them. This is especially true for guerilla terrorism. What terrorists are after is legitimacy and recognition. Once they gain regional sympathy and support, international legitimacy usually follows. Next thing you know the international media refers to them as "militants," "rebels," "insurgents" and finally as "freedom fighters."
It is also high time to debunk the myth that Turkey would have gained much leverage had it decided to cooperate with Washington in March 2003. We keep hearing this urban legend. In fact, you only need to look at Britain's Tony Blair, the most loyal of Bush supporters, to see a example of what would have happened to Turkey if Ankara had decided to play ball with the Bush administration. Blair received no rewards for his endless support for the American war effort in Iraq. He wanted a seat at the table after the war, but he soon discovered that the unilateralist Bush administration doesn't believe in tables. In 2003, Blair's only demand from President Bush was an international peace conference on the Middle East focusing on Arab-Israeli peace. Bush decided to wait until Blair was gone to consider the idea. To add insult to injury, Tony Blair ended up becoming the top envoy for the quartet dealing with Arab-Israeli peace, after he resigned as prime minister. History will not only remember him as the architect of "New Labor" but also as "the poodle of the United States." -- so much for sitting at the table with Washington.
It's really an irony of historic proportion that such a belligerent and unilateralist American president whose doctrine argues that: pre-emption works; that America is winning the "war on terror" because it is fighting terrorists "over there" rather than "over here"; and that "states harboring terrorist are no different than terrorists" would advise caution, rationalism and multilateralism when it comes to others. I hope Erdoğan can respond with a sense of humor by saying that all he wants is to apply the "Bush Doctrine" to the PKK. Yet, he should also know that the Bush doctrine will not solve PKK terrorism. The problem is not "over there" in northern Iraq.
No magic bullet against the PKK in Washington
What can be achieved by today's meeting between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Bush? The short answer is not much. There is a dangerous and irrational expectation in Turkey that if Washington suddenly decided to attack the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, the problem in Turkey would be magically solved. One can only wish things were so simple. In fact, the PKK is probably hoping that the US will take military action in northern Iraq. After all, being targeted and attacked by America will enhance the international legitimacy of this terrorist organization and elevate its status in the eyes of the anti-American world public opinion. How quickly we forget that there is always a "David versus Goliath" phenomenon when the weak encounter the mighty.
Over the last few weeks, the nationalist frenzy in Turkey has convinced itself that the PKK is an American and northern Iraq problem. Even well-intentioned liberal analysts started to revisit the thesis that Turkey would not be facing a PKK problem today if its parliament had decided to cooperate with Washington on March 1, 2003. Such views are naïve and wrong. It truly requires a strong degree of imagination to believe that the PKK is a product of America's invasion of Iraq or Iraqi Kurds decision to hurt Turkey. Instead of constantly blaming nefarious external forces, Turkish analysts and policy makers should learn to pay attention to domestic dynamics. It would also help to understand how nationalism, socio-economic problems and unfulfilled political expectations can become a toxic cocktail that fuels radicalism.
The PKK doesn't owe its existence, origins and power to external forces. It has been in action since 1978 and was at its most lethal and destructive in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the PKK became the symbol of Kurdish dissent and nationalism in Turkey. Yes, it was and still is a terrorist organization. The PKK used terrorism as a tactic to attack innocent civilians. But as the Turkish military unleashed its forces against it, the PKK also became -- at least in the eyes of a strong majority of the world -- a rebel movement fighting one of the most powerful militaries in the region. What Turkey failed to understand then, and still fails to understand today, is that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. Terrorists thrive when a larger and stronger force attacks them. This is especially true for guerilla terrorism. What terrorists are after is legitimacy and recognition. Once they gain regional sympathy and support, international legitimacy usually follows. Next thing you know the international media refers to them as "militants," "rebels," "insurgents" and finally as "freedom fighters."
It is also high time to debunk the myth that Turkey would have gained much leverage had it decided to cooperate with Washington in March 2003. We keep hearing this urban legend. In fact, you only need to look at Britain's Tony Blair, the most loyal of Bush supporters, to see a example of what would have happened to Turkey if Ankara had decided to play ball with the Bush administration. Blair received no rewards for his endless support for the American war effort in Iraq. He wanted a seat at the table after the war, but he soon discovered that the unilateralist Bush administration doesn't believe in tables. In 2003, Blair's only demand from President Bush was an international peace conference on the Middle East focusing on Arab-Israeli peace. Bush decided to wait until Blair was gone to consider the idea. To add insult to injury, Tony Blair ended up becoming the top envoy for the quartet dealing with Arab-Israeli peace, after he resigned as prime minister. History will not only remember him as the architect of "New Labor" but also as "the poodle of the United States." -- so much for sitting at the table with Washington.
It's really an irony of historic proportion that such a belligerent and unilateralist American president whose doctrine argues that: pre-emption works; that America is winning the "war on terror" because it is fighting terrorists "over there" rather than "over here"; and that "states harboring terrorist are no different than terrorists" would advise caution, rationalism and multilateralism when it comes to others. I hope Erdoğan can respond with a sense of humor by saying that all he wants is to apply the "Bush Doctrine" to the PKK. Yet, he should also know that the Bush doctrine will not solve PKK terrorism. The problem is not "over there" in northern Iraq.
Turkey's strategy against Kurds hinges on weather
MIAMI HERALD - Mon, Nov. 05, 2007
Turkey's strategy against Kurds hinges on weather
BY MATTHEW SCHOFIELD
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to decide whether to send his army south into Iraq in an effort to destroy rebel Kurdish bases there after a meeting Monday in Washington with President Bush.
But military experts say that what takes place at that meeting may not be as important to Erdogan's decision as another factor that neither Turkey nor the United States controls -- the weather.
''The winter snows are coming,'' said Sedat Laciner, director of Turkey's International Strategic Research Organization.
``The mountains are not an ideal military staging point in perfect weather. Once the winter arrives, they are impossible.''
Turkey has been threatening to send its military into northern Iraq in pursuit of guerrillas from the Kurdistan Workers' Party, known by its Kurdish initials as the PKK, who have killed 30 Turkish soldiers in the past month.
Hundredsof Turkish militia have been killed in the 25 years that the PKK has been fighting to establish an autonomous Kurdish state in southern Turkey.
But the United States, which has long included the PKK on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations, is hoping to dissuade Erdogan from launching an attack.
U.S. MEDIATES
On Sunday, U.S. officials served as the go-between in the return to Turkey of eight Turkish soldiers who had been captured Oct. 21 by PKK guerrillas.
Whether that will appease Turkish anger over PKK activities is unknown.
There was no official Turkish reaction to the release, except an acknowledgement that the soldiers were back in Turkey.
In a statement, the PKK said it expected Turkey to launch a military action soon and vowed to defend their positions in Iraq's Kandil Mountains with ``a ferocity that will teach them a lesson they will never forget.''
There will be no compromise, the statement said. ''We long for self-determination, and any solution that doesn't accomplish that -- to guarantee cultural, social and political rights -- will be refused,'' the statement said, quoting Zardesht Jody, a member of the PKK's leadership committee.
Still, military analysts said Erdogan's decision will be governed not by politics as much as by the difficulty of a winter military campaign.
Turkey has gathered tens of thousands of troops near the Iraqi border, a far larger force than the 3,000 PKK guerrillas Turkey estimates have taken refuge inside Iraq.
But the Kandil Mountains have few trails and roads. Sharply angled, and sparsely vegetated, military experts consider them impassable in the winter, especially for heavy equipment, or troop movements.
That could argue for a decision to move quickly, said Robert Ayers, an expert on terrorism at London's prestigious Chatham House research center.
HARSH TERRAIN
Ayers just returned from a visit with Turkish security officials.
''They can't move 30,000 into those mountains, only to have them trapped by the snows, both their escape route and supply routes cut off,'' Ayers said. ``If they're going in this year, and the mood seems to indicate there is the will to, there isn't much time left.''
Turkey's strategy against Kurds hinges on weather
BY MATTHEW SCHOFIELD
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to decide whether to send his army south into Iraq in an effort to destroy rebel Kurdish bases there after a meeting Monday in Washington with President Bush.
But military experts say that what takes place at that meeting may not be as important to Erdogan's decision as another factor that neither Turkey nor the United States controls -- the weather.
''The winter snows are coming,'' said Sedat Laciner, director of Turkey's International Strategic Research Organization.
``The mountains are not an ideal military staging point in perfect weather. Once the winter arrives, they are impossible.''
Turkey has been threatening to send its military into northern Iraq in pursuit of guerrillas from the Kurdistan Workers' Party, known by its Kurdish initials as the PKK, who have killed 30 Turkish soldiers in the past month.
Hundredsof Turkish militia have been killed in the 25 years that the PKK has been fighting to establish an autonomous Kurdish state in southern Turkey.
But the United States, which has long included the PKK on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations, is hoping to dissuade Erdogan from launching an attack.
U.S. MEDIATES
On Sunday, U.S. officials served as the go-between in the return to Turkey of eight Turkish soldiers who had been captured Oct. 21 by PKK guerrillas.
Whether that will appease Turkish anger over PKK activities is unknown.
There was no official Turkish reaction to the release, except an acknowledgement that the soldiers were back in Turkey.
In a statement, the PKK said it expected Turkey to launch a military action soon and vowed to defend their positions in Iraq's Kandil Mountains with ``a ferocity that will teach them a lesson they will never forget.''
There will be no compromise, the statement said. ''We long for self-determination, and any solution that doesn't accomplish that -- to guarantee cultural, social and political rights -- will be refused,'' the statement said, quoting Zardesht Jody, a member of the PKK's leadership committee.
Still, military analysts said Erdogan's decision will be governed not by politics as much as by the difficulty of a winter military campaign.
Turkey has gathered tens of thousands of troops near the Iraqi border, a far larger force than the 3,000 PKK guerrillas Turkey estimates have taken refuge inside Iraq.
But the Kandil Mountains have few trails and roads. Sharply angled, and sparsely vegetated, military experts consider them impassable in the winter, especially for heavy equipment, or troop movements.
That could argue for a decision to move quickly, said Robert Ayers, an expert on terrorism at London's prestigious Chatham House research center.
HARSH TERRAIN
Ayers just returned from a visit with Turkish security officials.
''They can't move 30,000 into those mountains, only to have them trapped by the snows, both their escape route and supply routes cut off,'' Ayers said. ``If they're going in this year, and the mood seems to indicate there is the will to, there isn't much time left.''
Erdogan Rules over Turkey's Deepest Divide
NPR.org-November 2, 2007
Erdogan Rules over Turkey's Deepest Divide
by Corey Flintoff
· Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is known as one of the most popular politicians in Turkey. Yet he represents the country's deepest divide — the question of whether the Turkish state is to be predominantly Muslim or secular.
Erdogan rose in politics through a secession of religious parties, each of which was eventually banned by Turkey's powerful military for violating secular principles. He is currently the leader of the Justice and Development Party, which denies any religious agenda.
"He says his party is not Islamist; it's conservative democrat," says Bulent Aliriza, the director of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Opponents say he's a fundamentalist who will ultimately try to turn Turkey to sharia (Muslim religious) law."
Religious vs. Secular Rule
Aliriza says it's difficult for Americans to understand the vehemence of Turkish feelings about religion in politics versus secular rule.
Until 1922, Turkey was the center of the declining Ottoman Empire, whose ruler, the sultan, was also the caliph, the leader of the Islamic community. Modern Turkey was envisioned as the antithesis of that, a democratic secular state that would foster social equality. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the nation's founder, was an Army commander, and the powerful Turkish army has remained the champion of secularism.
Sam Brannen, another expert on the region, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says critics believe Erdogan may eventually reveal himself as someone who wants to do away with Ataturk's secular vision. Brannen adds, though, that the prime minister has now "become so much a part of the secular institution that a religious agenda would undermine his own power."
Aliriza says Erdogan is a practical man, and there's one symbol that expresses where Erdogan has evolved in his thinking about religion and the state: it's the headscarf worn by devout Muslim women.
Challenges on the Road
As part of the effort to keep Turkey secular, the headscarf is banned in Turkish universities and it's frowned upon at state functions. Erdogan's wife, Emine, wears a headscarf, as do his two daughters who attended universities in the United States.
Aliriza says that, technically, Erdogan has the authority and the votes in parliament to change the law and allow headscarves in Turkish universities, but that would place him in direct confrontation with the military.
"Why hasn't he done it? You have to say that the man has adjusted to certain realities, and he refrains from doing things that he otherwise would have done," Aliriza says.
Despite Erdogan's practicality, though, Brannen says the prime minister is in a precarious position. He has staked a lot on bringing Turkey into the European Union, only to see France and Britain elect leaders who are not friendly to Turkey's bid for membership.
Erdogan is also facing a showdown with the PKK, the Kurdish guerrilla group that has been staging attacks on Turkish forces in southeastern Turkey from bases in northern Iraq. He'll need to work closely with the military to keep its commanders from going too far.
Many of Erdogan's supporters think he is tough enough and popular enough to hold his own.
The Early Days
Erdogan spent his childhood in a port town on the Black Sea, and his teenage years working his way through school by selling bread on the street in a tough neighborhood of Istanbul. He played semi-professional soccer for a club in the neighborhood for 16 years.
He was a transport worker in Istanbul and held other city jobs as he worked his way up in local politics. Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, and developed a reputation as an effective administrator, credited with building up the city's infrastructure and beautifying it, as well.
In 1998, he was convicted for reciting a poem that allegedly "incited religious hatred." Brannon says it was actually not an Islamist but a nationalist poem, but it stressed both faith and homeland. Erdogan served four months of a 10-month sentence.
That conviction proved to be a problem in 2002, when Erdogan's Justice and Development Party won a majority in the National Assembly. The conviction meant Erdogan was prohibited from running for parliament, and the constitution had to be changed to allow him to win a seat and take his place as prime minister.
Relationship with the United States
Brannen says Erdogan has more than just the Kurdish guerrilla issue to bring up with the U.S. government. He says Turkey wants more recognition for its contributions to the NATO peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. It also wants to know what Turkey would get in return if it complies with U.S. requests to cut ties with Iran and cut short contracts with Russia.
"The U.S. has promised Turkey a lot in the past," Brannen says, "but delivered very little. The trust is broken."
If talks don't work out between President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan, Brannen says there's another option.
"The Turks may just decide to wait out this administration," Brannen says.
Erdogan Rules over Turkey's Deepest Divide
by Corey Flintoff
· Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is known as one of the most popular politicians in Turkey. Yet he represents the country's deepest divide — the question of whether the Turkish state is to be predominantly Muslim or secular.
Erdogan rose in politics through a secession of religious parties, each of which was eventually banned by Turkey's powerful military for violating secular principles. He is currently the leader of the Justice and Development Party, which denies any religious agenda.
"He says his party is not Islamist; it's conservative democrat," says Bulent Aliriza, the director of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Opponents say he's a fundamentalist who will ultimately try to turn Turkey to sharia (Muslim religious) law."
Religious vs. Secular Rule
Aliriza says it's difficult for Americans to understand the vehemence of Turkish feelings about religion in politics versus secular rule.
Until 1922, Turkey was the center of the declining Ottoman Empire, whose ruler, the sultan, was also the caliph, the leader of the Islamic community. Modern Turkey was envisioned as the antithesis of that, a democratic secular state that would foster social equality. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the nation's founder, was an Army commander, and the powerful Turkish army has remained the champion of secularism.
Sam Brannen, another expert on the region, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says critics believe Erdogan may eventually reveal himself as someone who wants to do away with Ataturk's secular vision. Brannen adds, though, that the prime minister has now "become so much a part of the secular institution that a religious agenda would undermine his own power."
Aliriza says Erdogan is a practical man, and there's one symbol that expresses where Erdogan has evolved in his thinking about religion and the state: it's the headscarf worn by devout Muslim women.
Challenges on the Road
As part of the effort to keep Turkey secular, the headscarf is banned in Turkish universities and it's frowned upon at state functions. Erdogan's wife, Emine, wears a headscarf, as do his two daughters who attended universities in the United States.
Aliriza says that, technically, Erdogan has the authority and the votes in parliament to change the law and allow headscarves in Turkish universities, but that would place him in direct confrontation with the military.
"Why hasn't he done it? You have to say that the man has adjusted to certain realities, and he refrains from doing things that he otherwise would have done," Aliriza says.
Despite Erdogan's practicality, though, Brannen says the prime minister is in a precarious position. He has staked a lot on bringing Turkey into the European Union, only to see France and Britain elect leaders who are not friendly to Turkey's bid for membership.
Erdogan is also facing a showdown with the PKK, the Kurdish guerrilla group that has been staging attacks on Turkish forces in southeastern Turkey from bases in northern Iraq. He'll need to work closely with the military to keep its commanders from going too far.
Many of Erdogan's supporters think he is tough enough and popular enough to hold his own.
The Early Days
Erdogan spent his childhood in a port town on the Black Sea, and his teenage years working his way through school by selling bread on the street in a tough neighborhood of Istanbul. He played semi-professional soccer for a club in the neighborhood for 16 years.
He was a transport worker in Istanbul and held other city jobs as he worked his way up in local politics. Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, and developed a reputation as an effective administrator, credited with building up the city's infrastructure and beautifying it, as well.
In 1998, he was convicted for reciting a poem that allegedly "incited religious hatred." Brannon says it was actually not an Islamist but a nationalist poem, but it stressed both faith and homeland. Erdogan served four months of a 10-month sentence.
That conviction proved to be a problem in 2002, when Erdogan's Justice and Development Party won a majority in the National Assembly. The conviction meant Erdogan was prohibited from running for parliament, and the constitution had to be changed to allow him to win a seat and take his place as prime minister.
Relationship with the United States
Brannen says Erdogan has more than just the Kurdish guerrilla issue to bring up with the U.S. government. He says Turkey wants more recognition for its contributions to the NATO peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. It also wants to know what Turkey would get in return if it complies with U.S. requests to cut ties with Iran and cut short contracts with Russia.
"The U.S. has promised Turkey a lot in the past," Brannen says, "but delivered very little. The trust is broken."
If talks don't work out between President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan, Brannen says there's another option.
"The Turks may just decide to wait out this administration," Brannen says.
Erdogan Talks Turkey in Washington
TIME - Sunday, Nov. 04, 2007
Erdogan Talks Turkey in Washington
By Andrew Purvis
The visit by Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the White House on November 5 marks an important test of the relationship between America and its best ally in the Muslim world. In Erdogan, the U.S. has a friend who is that rarest of rarities: a democratically elected, democratically minded, economically liberal Islamist — an important bridge between the Muslim world and the secular West. The U.S. needs Erdogan as much as Erdogan needs Washington's cooperation in a recent slew of crises.
A lot is at stake. In the short term, Turkey wants a firm commitment from Washington to help rein in a Kurdish guerrilla group that has stepped up attacks on Turkish security forces, apparently from bases in Iraq, leaving more than 40 dead in October alone. Turkey believes the group, known as the PKK, or Kurdistan Worker's Party, represents as serious a threat to Turkey's existence as Washington says al-Qaeda does to America's. The group has bases in northern Iraq, and Turkey has been urging the U.S. in vain to help clean out those bases since U.S. troops arrived in 2003. In Washington, Erdogan will be seeking U.S. commitments, including military options, to address the PKK threat.
He also wants Washington to use its influence with Iraqi Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, who nominally control the region from which the PKK is operating, to crack down on the guerrillas. A failure to do so could lead Turkey to send its own troops across the border in pursuit of the PKK, an outcome that the U.S. wants to avoid not only because Iraq is ostensibly America's ally as well but because the Iraqi Kurds are that war-torn nation's only economic success story. Any large-scale movement of Turkish troops into Iraq raises the chances of a clash not just with the PKK but with Iraqi Kurdish soldiers.
For its part, Washington wants to avoid being compelled to intervene between two friends. And, on Sunday, a U.S. diplomatic push led to the release of eight Turkish soldiers held captive by the PKK in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdish leaders said they had played a role in the release.
That kind of action is crucial because Washington wants to be sure of Turkey's ongoing assistance as a staging point for oil and military supplies headed to Iraq. Turkey is also one of the few countries that can mediate between Washington and countries such as Iran and Syria. With war drums beating, Ankara may be a necessary mediator between Washington and Tehran.
In practical terms, Turkey is expected to seek either joint air strikes against PKK bases in the Qandil mountains, near the Iranian border, or American permission for Turkish planes to carry out strikes on their own. The Turkish public has been clamoring for action against the PKK in recent days. On Monday, celebrations of the 84th anniversary of modern Turkey's founding turned into massive nationwide demonstrations against the Kurdish group. The red and white Turkish flag hung across streets and from balconies; cars sported flags on their trunks. This militancy has put Erdogan and his political allies in a difficult spot. His Islamist roots have earned him the distrust of the Turkish military, the old power brokers in the country and the fortress of the nation's secular traditions. America's alliance was as much with the Turkish military as it was with the civilian government, perhaps more so. Indeed, Erdogan's government strongly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and did not allow Coalition forces to operate out of Turkish bases for the invasion.
Now, however, the U.S. needs to help Erdogan's government by enunciating policies that assuage Turkey's nationalist military and the voice it has found in the popular street demonstrations. Thus, in recent days, the U.S. has sounded more accommodating of Turkey's military proposals after earlier criticizing plans to send troops into northern Iraq. This week, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said that while Washington still opposes Turkish military operations inside the country "because obviously there are troubles enough in Iraq" Washington understands Turkey's concerns. "It is absolutely imperative that steps be taken to prevent such PKK attacks in the future," he said.
Furthermore, on Nov. 2, after speaking with Erdogan and her counterpart Ali Babacan in Ankara, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the U.S. and Turkey are now determined to work together against the "common enemy." "I affirmed to the Prime Minister as well as to the foreign minister that the United States considers the PKK a terrorist organization and indeed that we have a common enemy, that we must find ways to take effective action so that Turkey will not suffer from terrorist attacks," she told reporters after the meetings. "Such attacks are destabilizing for Iraq [and] a problem therefore of security for the United States and Turkey."
Turkey for its part has stressed that any incursion would seek only to attack the PKK and that Turkey had no designs on Iraqi territory, as some Iraqi Kurdish leaders have claimed. Foreign Minister Babacan said that if Turkey does dispatch troops "it would not be an invasion" but instead would consist more of commando raids on PKK positions.
Still, Turkey's PKK troubles are part of a larger set of problems with Kurds in the region. Turkey has accused the Iraqi Kurdish administration in northern Iraq of failing to do enough to clamp down on the PKK. This week, Turkey raised the possibility of economic sanctions against northern Iraq, including restrictions on the flow of traffic and goods at a key border crossing from Turkey into Iraq, as well as cutting off electricity that Turkey supplies to the region. Turkey's biggest fear is that Iraqi Kurds are intent on establishing a separate Kurdish state on their border, which might encourage Turkey's Kurdish minority to attempt to secede. That concern is growing ahead of a planned referendum in Iraq on control over the oil rich region of Kirkuk, a region that Iraqi Kurds claim as their own and control over which would sharply increase their economic and political clout.
In this contest, Turkey needs U.S. support to weigh in with Iraqi Kurds. Ridding the region of the PKK may sound like a difficult task, but starting a dialogue between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders that would lead to peaceful cohabitation in the region will prove more difficult still. With reporting by Pelin Turgut/Istanbul
Erdogan Talks Turkey in Washington
By Andrew Purvis
The visit by Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the White House on November 5 marks an important test of the relationship between America and its best ally in the Muslim world. In Erdogan, the U.S. has a friend who is that rarest of rarities: a democratically elected, democratically minded, economically liberal Islamist — an important bridge between the Muslim world and the secular West. The U.S. needs Erdogan as much as Erdogan needs Washington's cooperation in a recent slew of crises.
A lot is at stake. In the short term, Turkey wants a firm commitment from Washington to help rein in a Kurdish guerrilla group that has stepped up attacks on Turkish security forces, apparently from bases in Iraq, leaving more than 40 dead in October alone. Turkey believes the group, known as the PKK, or Kurdistan Worker's Party, represents as serious a threat to Turkey's existence as Washington says al-Qaeda does to America's. The group has bases in northern Iraq, and Turkey has been urging the U.S. in vain to help clean out those bases since U.S. troops arrived in 2003. In Washington, Erdogan will be seeking U.S. commitments, including military options, to address the PKK threat.
He also wants Washington to use its influence with Iraqi Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, who nominally control the region from which the PKK is operating, to crack down on the guerrillas. A failure to do so could lead Turkey to send its own troops across the border in pursuit of the PKK, an outcome that the U.S. wants to avoid not only because Iraq is ostensibly America's ally as well but because the Iraqi Kurds are that war-torn nation's only economic success story. Any large-scale movement of Turkish troops into Iraq raises the chances of a clash not just with the PKK but with Iraqi Kurdish soldiers.
For its part, Washington wants to avoid being compelled to intervene between two friends. And, on Sunday, a U.S. diplomatic push led to the release of eight Turkish soldiers held captive by the PKK in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdish leaders said they had played a role in the release.
That kind of action is crucial because Washington wants to be sure of Turkey's ongoing assistance as a staging point for oil and military supplies headed to Iraq. Turkey is also one of the few countries that can mediate between Washington and countries such as Iran and Syria. With war drums beating, Ankara may be a necessary mediator between Washington and Tehran.
In practical terms, Turkey is expected to seek either joint air strikes against PKK bases in the Qandil mountains, near the Iranian border, or American permission for Turkish planes to carry out strikes on their own. The Turkish public has been clamoring for action against the PKK in recent days. On Monday, celebrations of the 84th anniversary of modern Turkey's founding turned into massive nationwide demonstrations against the Kurdish group. The red and white Turkish flag hung across streets and from balconies; cars sported flags on their trunks. This militancy has put Erdogan and his political allies in a difficult spot. His Islamist roots have earned him the distrust of the Turkish military, the old power brokers in the country and the fortress of the nation's secular traditions. America's alliance was as much with the Turkish military as it was with the civilian government, perhaps more so. Indeed, Erdogan's government strongly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and did not allow Coalition forces to operate out of Turkish bases for the invasion.
Now, however, the U.S. needs to help Erdogan's government by enunciating policies that assuage Turkey's nationalist military and the voice it has found in the popular street demonstrations. Thus, in recent days, the U.S. has sounded more accommodating of Turkey's military proposals after earlier criticizing plans to send troops into northern Iraq. This week, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said that while Washington still opposes Turkish military operations inside the country "because obviously there are troubles enough in Iraq" Washington understands Turkey's concerns. "It is absolutely imperative that steps be taken to prevent such PKK attacks in the future," he said.
Furthermore, on Nov. 2, after speaking with Erdogan and her counterpart Ali Babacan in Ankara, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the U.S. and Turkey are now determined to work together against the "common enemy." "I affirmed to the Prime Minister as well as to the foreign minister that the United States considers the PKK a terrorist organization and indeed that we have a common enemy, that we must find ways to take effective action so that Turkey will not suffer from terrorist attacks," she told reporters after the meetings. "Such attacks are destabilizing for Iraq [and] a problem therefore of security for the United States and Turkey."
Turkey for its part has stressed that any incursion would seek only to attack the PKK and that Turkey had no designs on Iraqi territory, as some Iraqi Kurdish leaders have claimed. Foreign Minister Babacan said that if Turkey does dispatch troops "it would not be an invasion" but instead would consist more of commando raids on PKK positions.
Still, Turkey's PKK troubles are part of a larger set of problems with Kurds in the region. Turkey has accused the Iraqi Kurdish administration in northern Iraq of failing to do enough to clamp down on the PKK. This week, Turkey raised the possibility of economic sanctions against northern Iraq, including restrictions on the flow of traffic and goods at a key border crossing from Turkey into Iraq, as well as cutting off electricity that Turkey supplies to the region. Turkey's biggest fear is that Iraqi Kurds are intent on establishing a separate Kurdish state on their border, which might encourage Turkey's Kurdish minority to attempt to secede. That concern is growing ahead of a planned referendum in Iraq on control over the oil rich region of Kirkuk, a region that Iraqi Kurds claim as their own and control over which would sharply increase their economic and political clout.
In this contest, Turkey needs U.S. support to weigh in with Iraqi Kurds. Ridding the region of the PKK may sound like a difficult task, but starting a dialogue between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders that would lead to peaceful cohabitation in the region will prove more difficult still. With reporting by Pelin Turgut/Istanbul
For U.S. and Turkey, different priorities
November 5, 2007 - The Christian Science Monitor
For U.S. and Turkey, different priorities
In Washington Monday, the Turkish prime minister will focus on Kurdish rebels. The US will try to repair relations.
By Howard LaFranchi | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
On the surface, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Washington Monday is about Kurdish separatists across Turkey's border in northern Iraq, and whether the United States can pull Turkey back from launching an incursion against the rebels.
There will be lots of talk about the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, long involved in a bloody war with the Turkish government. Both the US and Turkey consider the group a terrorist organization.
But on another level, Mr. Erdogan's meeting at the White House with President Bush is about repairing relations with a crucial ally estranged by the war in Iraq. It will also test whether the US can keep a lid on the war-related flash points roiling the Middle East.
"It's high noon for the strategic relationship between the US and Turkey," says John Hulsman, a distinguished scholar in residence at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. "The PKK is the impetus, but the real issue is addressing relations that for the Bush administration have been going awry since the Iraq war."
Another "real issue" is Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, and what the Turkish military especially fears that means for Turkey, others say.
"If this were really only about the PKK, the Iraqi Kurds' offers to provide the Turks [with] information on the PKK would at least be accepted as a starting point," says Elizabeth Prodromou, a political expert on Turkey at Boston University, who is also a consultant to the State Department. "But it's not accepted because the military sees this in the context of Kurdish autonomy."
On Sunday, Kurdish rebels released eight Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq who had been captured two weeks earlier. The move could ease public pressure on Turkey's government to launch a cross-border invasion, but still, Turkey was unlikely to soften demands for tough action against the PKK.
Turkish officials have said that any decision about a cross-border incursion would await Erdogan's Washington visit.
White House officials are hoping that Turkey is in a mood to concentrate on its broad interests in a strong relationship with the US, rather than focusing narrowly or exclusively on the PKK. In addition to addressing efforts to counter the PKK, Erdogan and Mr. Bush will discuss "the promotion of peace and stability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader Middle East," as well as US support for Turkey's bid to join the European Union, the White House says.
But from the Turkish perspective, the PKK is the issue – and the goal of the trip is convincing the US that an offensive against the militants is justified, according to analysts. "Erdogan is coming with many files in his suitcase, but they are all on the PKK," says Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Erdogan will come with data on PKK attacks on Turkish sites and the military, on the dozens of Turks killed in PKK attacks in just this past month, and on PKK camps and strength in northern Iraq, Mr. Cagaptay says.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Turkish officials this past weekend in Turkey. Although the US has called for Turkish restraint in dealing with the PKK, Secretary Rice assured the officials that the US would help in the fight against the rebels.
"We consider this a common threat, not just to the interests of Turkey, but to the interests of the United States as well," she said Friday at a joint news conference with the Turkish foreign minister. "This is going to take persistence, and it's going to take commitment. This is a very difficult problem."
The US rates low marks from Turkish politicians and the Turkish public over what they see as an American failure to control the territory in next-door Iraq, where PKK militants appear to roam free.
They also believe the US has failed to get tough with the Iraqi Kurds, whom they fault for not going after the militants.
"The Turkish view is that Iraq is a crisis of our making that has made their life more difficult, says Mr. Hulsman.
At an international conference on Iraq Saturday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pledged to work with neighboring countries to address threats such as the PKK.
For U.S. and Turkey, different priorities
In Washington Monday, the Turkish prime minister will focus on Kurdish rebels. The US will try to repair relations.
By Howard LaFranchi | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
On the surface, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Washington Monday is about Kurdish separatists across Turkey's border in northern Iraq, and whether the United States can pull Turkey back from launching an incursion against the rebels.
There will be lots of talk about the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, long involved in a bloody war with the Turkish government. Both the US and Turkey consider the group a terrorist organization.
But on another level, Mr. Erdogan's meeting at the White House with President Bush is about repairing relations with a crucial ally estranged by the war in Iraq. It will also test whether the US can keep a lid on the war-related flash points roiling the Middle East.
"It's high noon for the strategic relationship between the US and Turkey," says John Hulsman, a distinguished scholar in residence at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. "The PKK is the impetus, but the real issue is addressing relations that for the Bush administration have been going awry since the Iraq war."
Another "real issue" is Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, and what the Turkish military especially fears that means for Turkey, others say.
"If this were really only about the PKK, the Iraqi Kurds' offers to provide the Turks [with] information on the PKK would at least be accepted as a starting point," says Elizabeth Prodromou, a political expert on Turkey at Boston University, who is also a consultant to the State Department. "But it's not accepted because the military sees this in the context of Kurdish autonomy."
On Sunday, Kurdish rebels released eight Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq who had been captured two weeks earlier. The move could ease public pressure on Turkey's government to launch a cross-border invasion, but still, Turkey was unlikely to soften demands for tough action against the PKK.
Turkish officials have said that any decision about a cross-border incursion would await Erdogan's Washington visit.
White House officials are hoping that Turkey is in a mood to concentrate on its broad interests in a strong relationship with the US, rather than focusing narrowly or exclusively on the PKK. In addition to addressing efforts to counter the PKK, Erdogan and Mr. Bush will discuss "the promotion of peace and stability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader Middle East," as well as US support for Turkey's bid to join the European Union, the White House says.
But from the Turkish perspective, the PKK is the issue – and the goal of the trip is convincing the US that an offensive against the militants is justified, according to analysts. "Erdogan is coming with many files in his suitcase, but they are all on the PKK," says Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Erdogan will come with data on PKK attacks on Turkish sites and the military, on the dozens of Turks killed in PKK attacks in just this past month, and on PKK camps and strength in northern Iraq, Mr. Cagaptay says.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Turkish officials this past weekend in Turkey. Although the US has called for Turkish restraint in dealing with the PKK, Secretary Rice assured the officials that the US would help in the fight against the rebels.
"We consider this a common threat, not just to the interests of Turkey, but to the interests of the United States as well," she said Friday at a joint news conference with the Turkish foreign minister. "This is going to take persistence, and it's going to take commitment. This is a very difficult problem."
The US rates low marks from Turkish politicians and the Turkish public over what they see as an American failure to control the territory in next-door Iraq, where PKK militants appear to roam free.
They also believe the US has failed to get tough with the Iraqi Kurds, whom they fault for not going after the militants.
"The Turkish view is that Iraq is a crisis of our making that has made their life more difficult, says Mr. Hulsman.
At an international conference on Iraq Saturday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pledged to work with neighboring countries to address threats such as the PKK.
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