By David Ignatius
Sunday, December 21, 2008; B07
ISTANBUL -- As Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's leading foreign policy strategist, explains the series of political choices that are ahead in the Middle East next year, he might be describing a row of dominoes. If they fall in the right direction, good things could happen. But if they start toppling the wrong way, watch out.
Davutoglu's domino theory deserves careful attention from Barack Obama's team as it thinks about Middle East strategy. The Turkish official knows his stuff. As the top adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he has managed Turkey's successful mediation between Syria and Israel as well as other delicate diplomacy in this messy part of the world.
Davutoglu spoke with me Wednesday in the Dolmabahce Palace on the shores of the Bosporus. The Ottoman setting was appropriate. For Davutoglu has overseen a shift in Turkish diplomacy over the past several years -- away from Europe and toward the surrounding region that, until a century ago, was governed from this ancient city. This change of emphasis upsets some Turks, but I'll get to that later.
What's intriguing about Davutoglu's analysis is that it involves a series of elections. That's good news for a region that has had too little democracy. The bad news is that voters may make choices that confound U.S. policy -- and that make peace in the region more difficult.
"We want the world community to understand that these elections are important, and that they will affect the Obama presidency," explains Davutoglu.
The string of political choices begins with the Palestinians. The term of President Mahmoud Abbas expires Jan. 9, and with it, his authority to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. Abbas had hoped that his term might be extended for a year as part of a reconciliation with the radical group Hamas.
Abbas may instead call for presidential and parliamentary elections early next year. Right now, polls show his Fatah organization ahead of Hamas, 42 percent to 28 percent. But the situation is explosive, quite literally, because Hamas's cease-fire with Israel expired on Friday. If Hamas votes with rockets, Israelis will become even more pessimistic about a two-state solution.
The next political domino is Israel itself. Elections will take place Feb. 10 to replace the government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Polls are predicting a victory for hard-line Likud candidate Binyamin Netanyahu, who has been a sharp critic of Olmert's efforts to create a Palestinian state. A Netanyahu victory would complicate U.S. policy choices, to put it mildly.
"If hard-liners begin to win [among Palestinians and Israelis], that means the issue will be security," says Davutoglu. "Security will be more important than peace."
There is balloting ahead in Iraq, too. The Jan. 31 local elections could reinforce the accord reached when the Iraqi parliament endorsed a three-year limit on the U.S. military presence. But it could also deepen Iraq's regional and sectarian tensions -- and provoke a new flare-up of violence just as Obama is preparing to withdraw troops.
The line of political dominoes continues. Lebanon goes to the polls to elect a new parliament in April, with a final round of voting in June. Iran and Saudi Arabia already are pumping in tens of millions of dollars to support their favorite candidates. And then in June, a crucial presidential election will take place in Iran, which will determine whether radical President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stays or goes.
Davutoglu says his slogan is "zero problems on our borders." The next few months will test whether that optimistic strategy is viable.
As I noted earlier, not everyone here is enthusiastic about the Turkish government's new stress on regional diplomacy. Critics argue that although Erdogan is still officially committed to joining the European Union, he is actually abandoning that goal. "They have lost enthusiasm on the E.U. All their energy now is on regional politics," contends Sedat Ergin, editor of the daily newspaper Milliyet.
Some Turks also worry that as Erdogan turns away from Europe, he is becoming less tolerant of his opponents. Critics cite his call in September for a boycott of Milliyet and other papers that had reported on a corruption case in Germany involving members of his party. "His limit of tolerance for freedom of the press and freedom of expression is pretty low," argues Soli Ozel, a columnist for Sabah newspaper.
Davutoglu stresses that Turkey's new regional role isn't a throwback to the days of the Ottoman pashas. The world has changed. Democracy rules. But that doesn't guarantee people will vote the way the United States wants.
davidignatius@washpost.com
Henry Kissinger 'ulus devlet'lere dikkat çekti
Henry Kissinger 'ulus devlet'lere dikkat çekti
CNN Turk - 19 Kasım, 2007 21:57:00 (TSİ)
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin dış politikası üzerinde en etkili isimlerinden biri olan Henry Kissinger, jeopolitik atmosferin değişmekte olduğunu söyledi. Ulus devlet sisteminin çöktüğünü belirten Kissinger, bunun bir tehdit olduğunu ifade etti.
Wall Street Journal gazetesine konuşan Kissinger, uluslararası politikaya dair vizyonunu anlatırken, ABD ile Avrupa arasında felsefi farklılıklar oluşmaya başladığına dikkat çekerek, Ortadoğu ve Asya'da batı karşıtlığının daha geniş bir ortak payda olduğunu belirtti.
"ABD'nin bir sonraki başkanı kim olursa olsun, yeni yönetim, sırf başkanın adı değişti diyen, ilişkilerin düzeleceğine inanırsa büyük hayal kırıklığına uğrar" diyen
Kissinger, dünyada 300 yıldır bilinen ulus devlete dayalı sistemin çöktüğünü ifade etti.
Kissinger, "Avrupa'da ulus devlet zayıflıyor. Sadece Rusya, ABD ve Asya'da klasik formunu koruyor. Bu da uluslararası istikrar için Nazi Almanyası ve Sovyetler Birliği'nden daha büyük tehdit" dedi.
"ABD ve Avrupa terörle mücadele gibi önemli dış politika konularında birbirinden ayrılıyor. Bunun ardında her iki tarafın halkından isteyebileceği fedakarlık derecesi yatıyor" diyen Kissinger, Avrupa'nın halkından daha fazla fedakarlık bekleyemeyeceği için yumuşak güce yöneldiğini, bunun da ABD ve AB arasında olası bir mutabakatı zora soktuğunu söyledi.
Ortadoğu ve Asya'da milliyetçilik hala önemli bir güç olduğunu kaydeden Kissinger, batı karşıtı İslam'ın kendisini daha çok gösterdiğini belirtti.
BM'nin yeniden oluşturulması gereken bir kurum olduğunu ifade eden Kissinger, "Konsey, Hindistan, Japonya, Brezilya ve Almanya gibi ülkeleri bünyesinde barındırmadığından, uluslararası toplumun gerçekliklerini yeterince temsil etmiyor" dedi.
Washigton'da siyaset anlayışının değiştiğini kaydeden Kissinger, ABD kongresinde Amerikan çıkarlarını uzun süreli gözeten senatörlerin bulunmadığını belirtti.
Kissinger, senatörlerin bir sonraki seçimlere odaklanmak gibi kısa vadeli siyasi hesaplar peşinde olduğunu söyledi.
CNN Turk - 19 Kasım, 2007 21:57:00 (TSİ)
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin dış politikası üzerinde en etkili isimlerinden biri olan Henry Kissinger, jeopolitik atmosferin değişmekte olduğunu söyledi. Ulus devlet sisteminin çöktüğünü belirten Kissinger, bunun bir tehdit olduğunu ifade etti.
Wall Street Journal gazetesine konuşan Kissinger, uluslararası politikaya dair vizyonunu anlatırken, ABD ile Avrupa arasında felsefi farklılıklar oluşmaya başladığına dikkat çekerek, Ortadoğu ve Asya'da batı karşıtlığının daha geniş bir ortak payda olduğunu belirtti.
"ABD'nin bir sonraki başkanı kim olursa olsun, yeni yönetim, sırf başkanın adı değişti diyen, ilişkilerin düzeleceğine inanırsa büyük hayal kırıklığına uğrar" diyen
Kissinger, dünyada 300 yıldır bilinen ulus devlete dayalı sistemin çöktüğünü ifade etti.
Kissinger, "Avrupa'da ulus devlet zayıflıyor. Sadece Rusya, ABD ve Asya'da klasik formunu koruyor. Bu da uluslararası istikrar için Nazi Almanyası ve Sovyetler Birliği'nden daha büyük tehdit" dedi.
"ABD ve Avrupa terörle mücadele gibi önemli dış politika konularında birbirinden ayrılıyor. Bunun ardında her iki tarafın halkından isteyebileceği fedakarlık derecesi yatıyor" diyen Kissinger, Avrupa'nın halkından daha fazla fedakarlık bekleyemeyeceği için yumuşak güce yöneldiğini, bunun da ABD ve AB arasında olası bir mutabakatı zora soktuğunu söyledi.
Ortadoğu ve Asya'da milliyetçilik hala önemli bir güç olduğunu kaydeden Kissinger, batı karşıtı İslam'ın kendisini daha çok gösterdiğini belirtti.
BM'nin yeniden oluşturulması gereken bir kurum olduğunu ifade eden Kissinger, "Konsey, Hindistan, Japonya, Brezilya ve Almanya gibi ülkeleri bünyesinde barındırmadığından, uluslararası toplumun gerçekliklerini yeterince temsil etmiyor" dedi.
Washigton'da siyaset anlayışının değiştiğini kaydeden Kissinger, ABD kongresinde Amerikan çıkarlarını uzun süreli gözeten senatörlerin bulunmadığını belirtti.
Kissinger, senatörlerin bir sonraki seçimlere odaklanmak gibi kısa vadeli siyasi hesaplar peşinde olduğunu söyledi.
Invasion is wrong answer to Turkey’s problems
Financial Times - Invasion is wrong answer to Turkey’s problems
By Wesley Clark
November 15 2007 18:41 | Last updated: November 15 2007 18:41
Just over a week after US president George W. Bush and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, met in Washington, Turkish troops remained poised to move across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to destroy elements of the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK). We can only hope that a solution based on the idea of joint co-operation against the PKK that seemed to be forged in the Oval Office meeting, focusing on diplomatic engagement between the US, Turkey, Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, will trump the still-looming military assault.
The Turks are understandably angry and ready for war. Accumulated frustrations over recent attacks by the PKK erupted in public demands for a decisive military solution. Turkish popular opinion strongly supported attacks on rebel base camps inside Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Turkish armed forces have mobilised more than 100,000 troops on the Iraqi border, setting the stage for a massive Turkish invasion of northern Iraq that would have disastrous consequences.
On paper all wars seem simple. Turkish military planners may hope that one bold thrust into Iraqi Kurdistan will, once and for all, eradicate the PKK. A glance at what soldiers call the “troop-to-task” ratio might suggest that the job could be done quickly. Turkey has a very good army and it would seem feasible that 100,000 well-trained and fully equipped Turkish troops could quickly capture or kill 3,000 PKK rebels hiding in an area somewhat larger than Maryland.
But war is never simple. The friction and fog of war always conspire to make the actual combat far more complex, time consuming and bloodier than the sterile and optimistic plans written in the comfort of remote headquarters. Even a military genius like Alexander the Great was stalled by the inhospitable terrain of southern Turkey and northern Iraq. Despite popular longing for a quick military solution, a Turkish invasion of Iraq would bring only stalemate, frustration and – more ominously – destabilise the region, undermine US-Turkish relations for decades, and jeopardise the stability and prosperity of Iraq’s Kurdistan region.
Turkey will certainly benefit by continuing on the more creative and diplomatic path now being pursued by Mr Erdogan. He has secured a US promise to share intelligence and to co-operate in neutralising PKK elements in Iraq and preventing their movement across the border. He should open a dialogue with the KRG to formulate joint measures to prevent the PKK from striking Turkey from Iraqi territory. To that end, he needs to embrace the establishment of four-party talks between Turkey, Iraq, the US and the KRG. This must be the way forward.
War is not the answer, especially given the creative alternatives available. First, strike the PKK where they are vulnerable, not in the mountain base camps where they are strongest. Divide the enemy by crafting an amnesty that permits civilians and lower level PKK members to lay down their arms and rejoin society. This worked in Northern Ireland to isolate radical fringes of the Irish Republican Army and it will work here, where the PKK’s popular support at best is tepid.
Second, the US and others could cripple PKK operations by cutting off its financial support. PKK’s centre of power is not, and never has been, in Iraqi Kurdistan; its popular base lies in south-eastern Turkey. Its financial base is in the cities of continental Europe, where the money is raised. Its leaders travel freely in European capitals. A co-ordinated international effort is needed to interdict the flow of money and supplies to the PKK.
Decades of military action against the PKK have failed to produce a lasting solution and it would fail again. Albert Einstein was not a military strategist but he did know something about how to solve problems. He also recognised the folly of substituting haste for thoughtful, reasoned decision making when he said: “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
Dealing with the PKK is an essential element of resolving the larger conflict in Iraq and improving the peace in the region. This challenge requires a creative strategy, one rooted in diplomacy and dialogue. Most of all it requires leaders with vision who rise above raw emotion – courageous leaders who are willing to forego short-term violent actions in order to wisely serve their nation’s long term interests.
General Clark is a former supreme commander of Nato, led the alliance of military forces in the Kosovo war (1999) and is a senior fellow at the Ron Burkle Center at UCLA
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
"FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy policy | Terms
By Wesley Clark
November 15 2007 18:41 | Last updated: November 15 2007 18:41
Just over a week after US president George W. Bush and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, met in Washington, Turkish troops remained poised to move across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to destroy elements of the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK). We can only hope that a solution based on the idea of joint co-operation against the PKK that seemed to be forged in the Oval Office meeting, focusing on diplomatic engagement between the US, Turkey, Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, will trump the still-looming military assault.
The Turks are understandably angry and ready for war. Accumulated frustrations over recent attacks by the PKK erupted in public demands for a decisive military solution. Turkish popular opinion strongly supported attacks on rebel base camps inside Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Turkish armed forces have mobilised more than 100,000 troops on the Iraqi border, setting the stage for a massive Turkish invasion of northern Iraq that would have disastrous consequences.
On paper all wars seem simple. Turkish military planners may hope that one bold thrust into Iraqi Kurdistan will, once and for all, eradicate the PKK. A glance at what soldiers call the “troop-to-task” ratio might suggest that the job could be done quickly. Turkey has a very good army and it would seem feasible that 100,000 well-trained and fully equipped Turkish troops could quickly capture or kill 3,000 PKK rebels hiding in an area somewhat larger than Maryland.
But war is never simple. The friction and fog of war always conspire to make the actual combat far more complex, time consuming and bloodier than the sterile and optimistic plans written in the comfort of remote headquarters. Even a military genius like Alexander the Great was stalled by the inhospitable terrain of southern Turkey and northern Iraq. Despite popular longing for a quick military solution, a Turkish invasion of Iraq would bring only stalemate, frustration and – more ominously – destabilise the region, undermine US-Turkish relations for decades, and jeopardise the stability and prosperity of Iraq’s Kurdistan region.
Turkey will certainly benefit by continuing on the more creative and diplomatic path now being pursued by Mr Erdogan. He has secured a US promise to share intelligence and to co-operate in neutralising PKK elements in Iraq and preventing their movement across the border. He should open a dialogue with the KRG to formulate joint measures to prevent the PKK from striking Turkey from Iraqi territory. To that end, he needs to embrace the establishment of four-party talks between Turkey, Iraq, the US and the KRG. This must be the way forward.
War is not the answer, especially given the creative alternatives available. First, strike the PKK where they are vulnerable, not in the mountain base camps where they are strongest. Divide the enemy by crafting an amnesty that permits civilians and lower level PKK members to lay down their arms and rejoin society. This worked in Northern Ireland to isolate radical fringes of the Irish Republican Army and it will work here, where the PKK’s popular support at best is tepid.
Second, the US and others could cripple PKK operations by cutting off its financial support. PKK’s centre of power is not, and never has been, in Iraqi Kurdistan; its popular base lies in south-eastern Turkey. Its financial base is in the cities of continental Europe, where the money is raised. Its leaders travel freely in European capitals. A co-ordinated international effort is needed to interdict the flow of money and supplies to the PKK.
Decades of military action against the PKK have failed to produce a lasting solution and it would fail again. Albert Einstein was not a military strategist but he did know something about how to solve problems. He also recognised the folly of substituting haste for thoughtful, reasoned decision making when he said: “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
Dealing with the PKK is an essential element of resolving the larger conflict in Iraq and improving the peace in the region. This challenge requires a creative strategy, one rooted in diplomacy and dialogue. Most of all it requires leaders with vision who rise above raw emotion – courageous leaders who are willing to forego short-term violent actions in order to wisely serve their nation’s long term interests.
General Clark is a former supreme commander of Nato, led the alliance of military forces in the Kosovo war (1999) and is a senior fellow at the Ron Burkle Center at UCLA
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
"FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy policy | Terms
An eminence grise
Turkey's foreign policy
An eminence grise
Nov 15th 2007 | ISTANBUL
From The Economist print edition
The visionary behind Turkey's newly assertive foreign policy
SHIMON PERES became the first Israeli president to address the parliament of a Muslim country when he spoke to Turkish deputies on November 13th. “We may be saying different prayers, but our eyes are turned toward the same sky and toward the same vision for the Middle East,” he told an audience that included both the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Turkish one, Abdullah Gul.
For Turkey, this was an historic moment, a chance to reclaim the muscle of its Ottoman forebears as a force in the Middle East. Until a few years ago, Turkey, with its intimate ties with America and Israel, was scorned by its Arab neighbours as a Western stooge. The suppression of public expressions of Muslim piety decreed by Ataturk merely reinforced the canard that Turkey was run by crypto-Jews.
But this image has faded since the mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party came to power five years ago. Even as it pursued the goal of European Union membership, AK started to revive long-dormant ties with the Muslim world. Driving this multi-pronged vision is Ahmet Davutoglu, the self-effacing chief adviser on foreign policy to the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Disgruntled foreign-ministry officials discount Mr Davutoglu's behind-the-scenes influence, but it is unquestionably huge. Both Mr Erdogan and Mr Gul call him Hodja, or teacher. The former academic drew their attention in the mid-1980s with essays on Islam and the West. Ali Babacan, Turkey's young foreign minister, whom Mr Erdogan is rumoured to be grooming as his successor, takes Mr Davutoglu with him wherever he goes.
Critics accuse Mr Davutoglu of pulling away from the West. Never more so than when Turkey invited Hamas's leader, Khaled Meshal, just as Condoleezza Rice, America's secretary of state, was flying to the Middle East to tell Arab governments not to deal with Hamas after its Palestine election win in January 2006. Many see this as the biggest foreign-policy blunder of the Erdogan era. Sitting in his office in the Ottoman sultan's last palace, Dolmabahce, Mr Davutoglu disagrees. Was it not America that exhorted Hamas to take part in the election, he asks. “So why refuse to recognise its results?” Turkey's aim was to persuade Hamas to recognise Israel. Yet the affair had a toxic effect on Turkey's relations with America and Israel.
Born into a merchant family in the conservative city of Konya, Mr Davutoglu is unabashedly pious. He clawed his way into an elite Istanbul lycée, where he was educated in German. Mr Davutoglu rankled at having to read Western classics before touching Turkish ones. Why were Turkey's ideas imported from the West? Where was the great Turkish thinker?
Mr Davutoglu's desire to transform Turkey into a pivotal country in the region lies at the heart of his vision. Turkey was long perceived, he told a conference, “as having strong muscles, a weak stomach, a troubled heart and a mediocre brain.” Getting away from this means creating strong economic ties across Turkey's borders. Even as the Turks threaten separatist PKK rebels inside northern Iraq, business ties with the Iraqi Kurds flourish. Hawks who called for the expulsion of Armenian migrants when an American congressional committee passed a bill calling the mass slaughter of Ottoman Armenians “genocide” were overruled. At the same time Mr Davutoglu is an avid proponent of Turkey's membership of the EU. “Turkey can be European in Europe and eastern in the East, because we are both,” he insists.
The chaos in Iraq and the escalation of PKK attacks remain Turkey's biggest headaches. Yet here too Turkey is taking the initiative. On November 5th it hosted a conference of Iraq's neighbours that was attended by Ms Rice. A day later Mr Davutoglu flew to Washington with Mr Erdogan. He was one of a handful of Turks present at Mr Erdogan's talks with George Bush. Dealing with Turkish foreign policy means dealing with Mr Davutoglu.
An eminence grise
Nov 15th 2007 | ISTANBUL
From The Economist print edition
The visionary behind Turkey's newly assertive foreign policy
SHIMON PERES became the first Israeli president to address the parliament of a Muslim country when he spoke to Turkish deputies on November 13th. “We may be saying different prayers, but our eyes are turned toward the same sky and toward the same vision for the Middle East,” he told an audience that included both the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Turkish one, Abdullah Gul.
For Turkey, this was an historic moment, a chance to reclaim the muscle of its Ottoman forebears as a force in the Middle East. Until a few years ago, Turkey, with its intimate ties with America and Israel, was scorned by its Arab neighbours as a Western stooge. The suppression of public expressions of Muslim piety decreed by Ataturk merely reinforced the canard that Turkey was run by crypto-Jews.
But this image has faded since the mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party came to power five years ago. Even as it pursued the goal of European Union membership, AK started to revive long-dormant ties with the Muslim world. Driving this multi-pronged vision is Ahmet Davutoglu, the self-effacing chief adviser on foreign policy to the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Disgruntled foreign-ministry officials discount Mr Davutoglu's behind-the-scenes influence, but it is unquestionably huge. Both Mr Erdogan and Mr Gul call him Hodja, or teacher. The former academic drew their attention in the mid-1980s with essays on Islam and the West. Ali Babacan, Turkey's young foreign minister, whom Mr Erdogan is rumoured to be grooming as his successor, takes Mr Davutoglu with him wherever he goes.
Critics accuse Mr Davutoglu of pulling away from the West. Never more so than when Turkey invited Hamas's leader, Khaled Meshal, just as Condoleezza Rice, America's secretary of state, was flying to the Middle East to tell Arab governments not to deal with Hamas after its Palestine election win in January 2006. Many see this as the biggest foreign-policy blunder of the Erdogan era. Sitting in his office in the Ottoman sultan's last palace, Dolmabahce, Mr Davutoglu disagrees. Was it not America that exhorted Hamas to take part in the election, he asks. “So why refuse to recognise its results?” Turkey's aim was to persuade Hamas to recognise Israel. Yet the affair had a toxic effect on Turkey's relations with America and Israel.
Born into a merchant family in the conservative city of Konya, Mr Davutoglu is unabashedly pious. He clawed his way into an elite Istanbul lycée, where he was educated in German. Mr Davutoglu rankled at having to read Western classics before touching Turkish ones. Why were Turkey's ideas imported from the West? Where was the great Turkish thinker?
Mr Davutoglu's desire to transform Turkey into a pivotal country in the region lies at the heart of his vision. Turkey was long perceived, he told a conference, “as having strong muscles, a weak stomach, a troubled heart and a mediocre brain.” Getting away from this means creating strong economic ties across Turkey's borders. Even as the Turks threaten separatist PKK rebels inside northern Iraq, business ties with the Iraqi Kurds flourish. Hawks who called for the expulsion of Armenian migrants when an American congressional committee passed a bill calling the mass slaughter of Ottoman Armenians “genocide” were overruled. At the same time Mr Davutoglu is an avid proponent of Turkey's membership of the EU. “Turkey can be European in Europe and eastern in the East, because we are both,” he insists.
The chaos in Iraq and the escalation of PKK attacks remain Turkey's biggest headaches. Yet here too Turkey is taking the initiative. On November 5th it hosted a conference of Iraq's neighbours that was attended by Ms Rice. A day later Mr Davutoglu flew to Washington with Mr Erdogan. He was one of a handful of Turks present at Mr Erdogan's talks with George Bush. Dealing with Turkish foreign policy means dealing with Mr Davutoglu.
FEATURE-Turkey's village guards face danger from all sides
Reuters - Wed Nov 14, 2007 1:18am EST
By Thomas Grove
HILAL, Turkey, Nov 14 (Reuters) - With a rifle slung around his neck, Sadik Babat points to where his house stood before being destroyed in Turkey's scorched-earth campaign in the 1990s against villages suspected of supporting Kurdish separatists.
Babat, a Turkish Kurd, is an unlikely figure to be working as one of 57,000 state-sponsored village guards throughout Turkey's southeast, acting as a guide and fighting the Kurdish rebels alongside the same army that destroyed his home.
But with recent legislation aimed at boosting their numbers by the thousands and a possible cross-border operation into Iraq looming, these villagers, labelled traitors by many of their kin, may become more important than ever to Turkey's military.
Ankara has amassed 100,000 troops on its border with Iraq and threatened a cross-border offensive to crack down on rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based in mainly Kurdish northern Iraq.
The army says the village guards' knowledge of this remote mountainous terrain is key to operations in guerrilla warfare.
"I've probably participated in more than 500 operations over the last 21 years. At the end of some I've been the last one standing, and there have been times when I've shot and killed, too," Babat said loading his rifle in a single, fluid motion.
The PKK took up arms against the Turkish state in 1984 with the aim of creating an ethnic Kurdish homeland in the southeast. Nearly 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict.
Officially the guards are part of a controversial policy established in 1985 to set up a paramilitary force to protect villages against PKK attacks, patrol the rugged mountains and help fight the separatists.
But their right to carry arms, to inform on suspected separatist activities and to kill in the name of the state has made them a force within the region, while critics say they use their status to settle family scores and take over land.
UNACCOUNTABLE FORCE
"They are an armed and unaccountable force and the rules by which they are governed are very ill defined, so they can get away with murder, theft," said Emma Sinclair-Webb, a researcher on Turkey for U.S.-based Human Rights Watch.
Since the system's implementation, 4,972 guards have committed recorded crimes, while 853 have been imprisoned, according to parliamentary records.
The guards have also been criticised in the latest European Union progress report, which says their armed presence has hampered the efforts of displaced villagers to return to their homes in the southeast.
One village guard walking his donkey on a border road said there is little love for him and his fellow guards.
"If they ever take my gun away the first thing that will happen is I'll get hung in the village square," said the man who gave only his first name as Cinsi.
In the southeast, Turkey's military -- the second largest in NATO -- has always said the decision to join the guards is voluntary, but villagers say their decision to sign up has been accompanied by force.
Even Babat acknowledges the contradiction of working with the army that destroyed his own village of Hilal, and says he joined purely out of pragmatism.
"When they destroyed our village, some people joined the PKK, others fled to northern Iraq. If you wanted to stay you had to become a village guard," said Babat, looking over the river that once ran through Hilal.
Village guards say the 500 lira ($424) monthly salary also draws enlistments in the country's poorest region.
With participation largely dictated by economics or force, loyalties can be uncertain and telling friend from foe can be difficult and dangerous.
Babat, like other guards, carries his rifle everywhere he goes -- slung over his shoulder at the grocer's or walking along the mountain roads -- to defend against both members of the PKK and intelligence services who may think he is a double agent.
In October six guards working in the area were arrested for informing the PKK about army operations, security sources said.
"There has always been informing. That's nothing new. I've known people that have worked both sides for years. With the things that happen out here ... sometimes you know that someone is informing," said Babat.
With Turkey's top general saying they are waiting for orders for a cross-border operation, village guards say they do not want an even greater military presence in their backyard.
But Babat says he will fight if the need arises.
"I'm not afraid, there's no fear in me. If I meet a terrorist on the road, I'll shoot and I'll make sure I'm the last one standing." (Editing by Stephen Weeks)
By Thomas Grove
HILAL, Turkey, Nov 14 (Reuters) - With a rifle slung around his neck, Sadik Babat points to where his house stood before being destroyed in Turkey's scorched-earth campaign in the 1990s against villages suspected of supporting Kurdish separatists.
Babat, a Turkish Kurd, is an unlikely figure to be working as one of 57,000 state-sponsored village guards throughout Turkey's southeast, acting as a guide and fighting the Kurdish rebels alongside the same army that destroyed his home.
But with recent legislation aimed at boosting their numbers by the thousands and a possible cross-border operation into Iraq looming, these villagers, labelled traitors by many of their kin, may become more important than ever to Turkey's military.
Ankara has amassed 100,000 troops on its border with Iraq and threatened a cross-border offensive to crack down on rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based in mainly Kurdish northern Iraq.
The army says the village guards' knowledge of this remote mountainous terrain is key to operations in guerrilla warfare.
"I've probably participated in more than 500 operations over the last 21 years. At the end of some I've been the last one standing, and there have been times when I've shot and killed, too," Babat said loading his rifle in a single, fluid motion.
The PKK took up arms against the Turkish state in 1984 with the aim of creating an ethnic Kurdish homeland in the southeast. Nearly 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict.
Officially the guards are part of a controversial policy established in 1985 to set up a paramilitary force to protect villages against PKK attacks, patrol the rugged mountains and help fight the separatists.
But their right to carry arms, to inform on suspected separatist activities and to kill in the name of the state has made them a force within the region, while critics say they use their status to settle family scores and take over land.
UNACCOUNTABLE FORCE
"They are an armed and unaccountable force and the rules by which they are governed are very ill defined, so they can get away with murder, theft," said Emma Sinclair-Webb, a researcher on Turkey for U.S.-based Human Rights Watch.
Since the system's implementation, 4,972 guards have committed recorded crimes, while 853 have been imprisoned, according to parliamentary records.
The guards have also been criticised in the latest European Union progress report, which says their armed presence has hampered the efforts of displaced villagers to return to their homes in the southeast.
One village guard walking his donkey on a border road said there is little love for him and his fellow guards.
"If they ever take my gun away the first thing that will happen is I'll get hung in the village square," said the man who gave only his first name as Cinsi.
In the southeast, Turkey's military -- the second largest in NATO -- has always said the decision to join the guards is voluntary, but villagers say their decision to sign up has been accompanied by force.
Even Babat acknowledges the contradiction of working with the army that destroyed his own village of Hilal, and says he joined purely out of pragmatism.
"When they destroyed our village, some people joined the PKK, others fled to northern Iraq. If you wanted to stay you had to become a village guard," said Babat, looking over the river that once ran through Hilal.
Village guards say the 500 lira ($424) monthly salary also draws enlistments in the country's poorest region.
With participation largely dictated by economics or force, loyalties can be uncertain and telling friend from foe can be difficult and dangerous.
Babat, like other guards, carries his rifle everywhere he goes -- slung over his shoulder at the grocer's or walking along the mountain roads -- to defend against both members of the PKK and intelligence services who may think he is a double agent.
In October six guards working in the area were arrested for informing the PKK about army operations, security sources said.
"There has always been informing. That's nothing new. I've known people that have worked both sides for years. With the things that happen out here ... sometimes you know that someone is informing," said Babat.
With Turkey's top general saying they are waiting for orders for a cross-border operation, village guards say they do not want an even greater military presence in their backyard.
But Babat says he will fight if the need arises.
"I'm not afraid, there's no fear in me. If I meet a terrorist on the road, I'll shoot and I'll make sure I'm the last one standing." (Editing by Stephen Weeks)
Turkey’s Choice with Barzani: The Gun or the Olive Branch
Turkey’s Choice with Barzani: The Gun or the Olive Branch
Jamestown Foundation / GTA - By David Romano
Shortly after the Turkish National Assembly passed a resolution authorizing the Turkish army to enter northern Iraq, President Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) replied: “If they invade there will be war.” Barzani added: “We are not a threat to Turkey and I do not accept the language of threatening and blackmailing from the government of Turkey” (The Independent, October 29). Barzani was also unwilling to contemplate a Turkish demand that he send his own KRG troops to fight PKK militants operating out of the extremely mountainous terrain of northeastern Iraq, insisting that his “main mission would be not to allow a Kurdish-Kurdish fight to happen within the Kurdish liberation movement.” President Barzani’s statements, and particularly his implicit reference to the PKK as part of “the Kurdish liberation movement,” inflamed Turkish nationalist sentiment, but played well amongst Iraqi Kurds. Barzani also provoked fury in Turkey in April, when he stated that if Turkey has the right to involve itself in the Kirkuk issue, Iraqi Kurds have the right to involve themselves in Diyarbakir, the largest predominantly Kurdish city in Turkey (Hurriyet, April 8). Turkish media reacts quickly to any such statements, and Barzani’s name regularly makes the front page of mass circulation Turkish newspapers, although never preceded with honorific titles such as “Mr.” or “President.”
Since Barzani became president of the KRG and his fellow Kurd and erstwhile rival Jalal Talabani became president of Iraq, the former made public statements that have tended to be more confrontational towards Turkey, while the latter appears to have pursued a more diplomatic discourse with Ankara. Part of the explanation for this difference may come from the fact that KRG President Barzani views his role as catering more to the sensibilities of his Iraqi Kurdish constituents, while Iraqi President Talabani tries to represent all of Iraq. Another part of the explanation may be more personal, however: As President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani receives full Turkish recognition and all the respect due a head of state. In contrast, Turkish media and government officials have consistently snubbed Massoud Barzani, refusing to refer to him as “President,” unwilling to accord him diplomatic honors or dialogue with high Turkish officials, and apparently reluctant to even say “Kurdistan Regional Government.” In an interview with the Turkish newspaper Milliyet on October 30, after insisting that he was a friend of Turkey and desired good relations, Barzani asked: “You [Turkey] do not talk to me in an official capacity. You do not accept me as a partner for talks. You do not maintain a dialogue with me. Then suddenly you want me to take action for you against the PKK? Is this a way to do things?”
Governments may conduct politics and diplomacy, but governments are made up of people, and people want recognition and respect from one another. So while Iraqi Kurdish leaders such as Jalal Talabani, Hoshyar Zebari (Iraq’s foreign minister), Barham Salih (Iraq’s deputy prime minister) and Nechirvan Barzani (the KRG’s prime minister) try to smooth over disputes with Ankara, President Barzani may increasingly see himself as the repository of Iraqi Kurdish pride and dignity in the face of Turkish bullying.
In the October 30 interview with Milliyet, Barzani went on to question whether or not a Turkish military incursion into Iraq would really be aimed at the PKK, given that many such incursions failed in the 1990s. He suggested that perhaps Turkey was more interested in targeting Iraqi Kurdistan as a whole, despite the region’s desire for friendly relations with Turkey. If the Turkish government is indeed intent on targeting Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, then Barzani may reason that nothing will dissuade it, and there is no point in submitting to Ankara or taking the difficult steps needed to contain the PKK militants based in his region. Asked about what would happen if Turkey enacted an embargo on Iraqi Kurdistan, Barzani replied: “We would not starve” (The Independent, October 29).
Nonetheless, President Barzani is well aware of land-locked Iraqi Kurdistan’s dependence on Turkey for trade, investment (80% of which comes from Turkey) and an outlet to the world. The KRG’s peshmerga militias are no match for the second largest army in NATO, although together with the PKK they could certainly wage a mountain-based guerrilla war and exact a very heavy toll on Turkish forces. Barzani wishes to avoid a conflict with Turkey, although not at any price. He has ordered stricter measures to deny PKK militants freedom of movement and ease of supply in Iraqi Kurdistan. His prime minister and nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, published an op-ed in the November 5 issue of the Washington Post calling for peaceful relations and cooperation between Turkey and the KRG, insisting that the PKK is friend to neither.
Either a military confrontation or an economic embargo would cost Turkey dearly. Turkey’s military knows that it cannot completely dislodge the PKK from the extremely rugged mountains near the border, and an embargo on the KRG would impact Turkey’s economically depressed and volatile Kurdish southeast almost as negatively as it would Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkish companies are also doing brisk business in Iraqi Kurdistan. Such considerations are leading prominent voices in Turkey to begin suggesting that Ankara change its approach and embrace Iraqi Kurdistan. Deniz Baykal, leader of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), recently stated that Turkey should strengthen its trade and friendly relations with northern Iraq as part of a more sustainable way of reducing terrorism in the long-term (Hurriyet, November 10). Influential Turkish columnist Mehmet Ali Birand likewise advocates a new approach towards KRG President Barzani: “Massoud Barzani eats at the White House with President Bush. Then he goes to the European Parliament and has lunch with the representatives. He even tours Europe and makes friends with leaders. What does he find when goes back home? Turkey calls him a tribal chieftain. He is refused admittance. He's treated as a nobody. This is the attitude that upsets Massoud Barzani most and goads him into protecting the PKK” (Turkish Daily News, November 10).
Should Turkey’s political and military leadership recognize Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and begin treating KRG leaders with the same level of respect they accord to Turkish Cypriot leaders, the new approach might go a long way towards reassuring Iraqi Kurds and fostering the kind of relationship necessary for cooperation against PKK incursions.
Jamestown Foundation / GTA - By David Romano
Shortly after the Turkish National Assembly passed a resolution authorizing the Turkish army to enter northern Iraq, President Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) replied: “If they invade there will be war.” Barzani added: “We are not a threat to Turkey and I do not accept the language of threatening and blackmailing from the government of Turkey” (The Independent, October 29). Barzani was also unwilling to contemplate a Turkish demand that he send his own KRG troops to fight PKK militants operating out of the extremely mountainous terrain of northeastern Iraq, insisting that his “main mission would be not to allow a Kurdish-Kurdish fight to happen within the Kurdish liberation movement.” President Barzani’s statements, and particularly his implicit reference to the PKK as part of “the Kurdish liberation movement,” inflamed Turkish nationalist sentiment, but played well amongst Iraqi Kurds. Barzani also provoked fury in Turkey in April, when he stated that if Turkey has the right to involve itself in the Kirkuk issue, Iraqi Kurds have the right to involve themselves in Diyarbakir, the largest predominantly Kurdish city in Turkey (Hurriyet, April 8). Turkish media reacts quickly to any such statements, and Barzani’s name regularly makes the front page of mass circulation Turkish newspapers, although never preceded with honorific titles such as “Mr.” or “President.”
Since Barzani became president of the KRG and his fellow Kurd and erstwhile rival Jalal Talabani became president of Iraq, the former made public statements that have tended to be more confrontational towards Turkey, while the latter appears to have pursued a more diplomatic discourse with Ankara. Part of the explanation for this difference may come from the fact that KRG President Barzani views his role as catering more to the sensibilities of his Iraqi Kurdish constituents, while Iraqi President Talabani tries to represent all of Iraq. Another part of the explanation may be more personal, however: As President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani receives full Turkish recognition and all the respect due a head of state. In contrast, Turkish media and government officials have consistently snubbed Massoud Barzani, refusing to refer to him as “President,” unwilling to accord him diplomatic honors or dialogue with high Turkish officials, and apparently reluctant to even say “Kurdistan Regional Government.” In an interview with the Turkish newspaper Milliyet on October 30, after insisting that he was a friend of Turkey and desired good relations, Barzani asked: “You [Turkey] do not talk to me in an official capacity. You do not accept me as a partner for talks. You do not maintain a dialogue with me. Then suddenly you want me to take action for you against the PKK? Is this a way to do things?”
Governments may conduct politics and diplomacy, but governments are made up of people, and people want recognition and respect from one another. So while Iraqi Kurdish leaders such as Jalal Talabani, Hoshyar Zebari (Iraq’s foreign minister), Barham Salih (Iraq’s deputy prime minister) and Nechirvan Barzani (the KRG’s prime minister) try to smooth over disputes with Ankara, President Barzani may increasingly see himself as the repository of Iraqi Kurdish pride and dignity in the face of Turkish bullying.
In the October 30 interview with Milliyet, Barzani went on to question whether or not a Turkish military incursion into Iraq would really be aimed at the PKK, given that many such incursions failed in the 1990s. He suggested that perhaps Turkey was more interested in targeting Iraqi Kurdistan as a whole, despite the region’s desire for friendly relations with Turkey. If the Turkish government is indeed intent on targeting Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, then Barzani may reason that nothing will dissuade it, and there is no point in submitting to Ankara or taking the difficult steps needed to contain the PKK militants based in his region. Asked about what would happen if Turkey enacted an embargo on Iraqi Kurdistan, Barzani replied: “We would not starve” (The Independent, October 29).
Nonetheless, President Barzani is well aware of land-locked Iraqi Kurdistan’s dependence on Turkey for trade, investment (80% of which comes from Turkey) and an outlet to the world. The KRG’s peshmerga militias are no match for the second largest army in NATO, although together with the PKK they could certainly wage a mountain-based guerrilla war and exact a very heavy toll on Turkish forces. Barzani wishes to avoid a conflict with Turkey, although not at any price. He has ordered stricter measures to deny PKK militants freedom of movement and ease of supply in Iraqi Kurdistan. His prime minister and nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, published an op-ed in the November 5 issue of the Washington Post calling for peaceful relations and cooperation between Turkey and the KRG, insisting that the PKK is friend to neither.
Either a military confrontation or an economic embargo would cost Turkey dearly. Turkey’s military knows that it cannot completely dislodge the PKK from the extremely rugged mountains near the border, and an embargo on the KRG would impact Turkey’s economically depressed and volatile Kurdish southeast almost as negatively as it would Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkish companies are also doing brisk business in Iraqi Kurdistan. Such considerations are leading prominent voices in Turkey to begin suggesting that Ankara change its approach and embrace Iraqi Kurdistan. Deniz Baykal, leader of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), recently stated that Turkey should strengthen its trade and friendly relations with northern Iraq as part of a more sustainable way of reducing terrorism in the long-term (Hurriyet, November 10). Influential Turkish columnist Mehmet Ali Birand likewise advocates a new approach towards KRG President Barzani: “Massoud Barzani eats at the White House with President Bush. Then he goes to the European Parliament and has lunch with the representatives. He even tours Europe and makes friends with leaders. What does he find when goes back home? Turkey calls him a tribal chieftain. He is refused admittance. He's treated as a nobody. This is the attitude that upsets Massoud Barzani most and goads him into protecting the PKK” (Turkish Daily News, November 10).
Should Turkey’s political and military leadership recognize Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and begin treating KRG leaders with the same level of respect they accord to Turkish Cypriot leaders, the new approach might go a long way towards reassuring Iraqi Kurds and fostering the kind of relationship necessary for cooperation against PKK incursions.
U.S. Sharing Intelligence With Turkey
NYT- November 15, 2007
U.S. Sharing Intelligence With Turkey
By SEBNEM ARSU
IZMIR, Turkey, Nov 14 — The United States has begun to share real-time intelligence with Turkey to assist in its efforts to track down separatist Kurdish rebels hiding in northern Iraq, Ali Babacan, the Turkish foreign minister said on Wednesday.
President Bush, in his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan early this month, agreed to share intelligence for surgical strikes in combat against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or PKK, in order to avoid a larger-scale invasion by Turkey.
“Following the authorization of President Bush, all units started to act in accordance with a new approach and ordering,” Mr. Babacan said, speaking to semiofficial Anatolian Agency.
Speaking of Turkey’s past struggles with a lack of real-time intelligence, Mr. Babacan added, “Orders are given to prevent such recurrences. Implementation is important, we will see how implementation goes in the period ahead.”
The PKK, seeking autonomy in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast, has recently escalated attacks. Turkey’s Parliament responded to these raids in October by approving permission for cross-border operations into Iraq to eliminate the rebels’ hideouts.
The United States and Iraq oppose a major Turkish military movement in the region and strongly suggest diplomatic ways to resolve the conflict, while Turkey has been demanding immediate tangible steps by both countries to neutralize the PKK.
The fighting has continued as the various governments have sought a solution. On Tuesday Kurdish rebels killed four soldiers and wounded nine others during clashes in mountainous areas of Sirnak Province in southeastern Turkey. Several news services indicated that Turkish planes attacked empty Iraqi villages during the fighting.
Gen. Aydogan Babaoglu, the Turkish Air Force commander, denied news reports that Turkish fighter jets had engaged in any cross-border operation during those clashes. “I don’t know how the press comes up with such news,” General Babaoglu said, speaking to the semiofficial Anatolian News Agency in northern Cyprus.
“This news item has been appearing almost in every television network since yesterday afternoon. I was on duty at that time, and not a single plane of the Turkish Air Force was engaged in any kind of operation. There’s nothing like that. Such news absolutely have no grounds.”
U.S. Sharing Intelligence With Turkey
By SEBNEM ARSU
IZMIR, Turkey, Nov 14 — The United States has begun to share real-time intelligence with Turkey to assist in its efforts to track down separatist Kurdish rebels hiding in northern Iraq, Ali Babacan, the Turkish foreign minister said on Wednesday.
President Bush, in his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan early this month, agreed to share intelligence for surgical strikes in combat against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or PKK, in order to avoid a larger-scale invasion by Turkey.
“Following the authorization of President Bush, all units started to act in accordance with a new approach and ordering,” Mr. Babacan said, speaking to semiofficial Anatolian Agency.
Speaking of Turkey’s past struggles with a lack of real-time intelligence, Mr. Babacan added, “Orders are given to prevent such recurrences. Implementation is important, we will see how implementation goes in the period ahead.”
The PKK, seeking autonomy in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast, has recently escalated attacks. Turkey’s Parliament responded to these raids in October by approving permission for cross-border operations into Iraq to eliminate the rebels’ hideouts.
The United States and Iraq oppose a major Turkish military movement in the region and strongly suggest diplomatic ways to resolve the conflict, while Turkey has been demanding immediate tangible steps by both countries to neutralize the PKK.
The fighting has continued as the various governments have sought a solution. On Tuesday Kurdish rebels killed four soldiers and wounded nine others during clashes in mountainous areas of Sirnak Province in southeastern Turkey. Several news services indicated that Turkish planes attacked empty Iraqi villages during the fighting.
Gen. Aydogan Babaoglu, the Turkish Air Force commander, denied news reports that Turkish fighter jets had engaged in any cross-border operation during those clashes. “I don’t know how the press comes up with such news,” General Babaoglu said, speaking to the semiofficial Anatolian News Agency in northern Cyprus.
“This news item has been appearing almost in every television network since yesterday afternoon. I was on duty at that time, and not a single plane of the Turkish Air Force was engaged in any kind of operation. There’s nothing like that. Such news absolutely have no grounds.”
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